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CRIMINALIZING NORMAL ADOLESCENT
BEHAVIOR IN COMMUNITIES OF COLOR:
THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORS IN
JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM
Kristin Henning†
There is little dispute that racial disparities pervade the contemporary
American juvenile justice system.  The persistent overrepresentation of youth
of color in the system suggests that scientifically supported notions of dimin-
ished culpability of youth are not applied consistently across races.  Drawing
from recent studies on implicit bias and the impact of race on perceptions of
adolescent culpability, Professor Kristin Henning contends that contempo-
rary narratives portraying black and Hispanic youth as dangerous and irre-
deemable lead prosecutors to disproportionately reject youth as a mitigating
factor for their delinquent behavior.  Although racial disparities begin at ar-
rest and persist through every stage of the juvenile justice process, this Article
focuses specifically on the unique opportunity and obligation that prosecutors
have to address those disparities at the charging phase of the juvenile case.
Professor Henning implores juvenile prosecutors to resist external pres-
sures to respond punitively to exaggerated perceptions of threat by youth of
color and envisions a path toward structured decision making at the charg-
ing phase that is informed by research in adolescent development, that chal-
lenges distorted notions of race and maturity, and that holds prosecutors
accountable for equitable decision making across race.  While fully embracing
legitimate prosecutorial concerns about victims’ rights and public safety, Pro-
fessor Henning frames the charging decision as one requiring fairness, eq-
uity, and efficacy.  Fairness requires prosecutors to evaluate juvenile
culpability in light of the now well-documented features of adolescent offend-
ing.  Equity demands an impartial application of the developmental research
to all youth, regardless of race and socioeconomic status.  Efficacy asks prose-
cutors to rely on scientifically validated best practices for ensuring positive
youth development and achieving public safety.  Thus, even when neighbor-
hood effects and social structures produce opportunities for more serious and
frequent crime among youth of color, prosecutors have a duty to evaluate and
respond to that behavior with the same developmentally appropriate options
that are so often available to white youth.
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and Professor of Law, Georgetown Law.  I would like to thank Lauren Dollar, Rebecca
Pullwater-Poza, and Alyssa Work for their invaluable research.  I am also grateful for the
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Further, as the gatekeepers of juvenile court jurisdiction, prosecutors
should work with developmental experts, school officials, and other commu-
nity representatives to develop and publish juvenile charging standards that
reflect these goals.  To increase transparency and encourage buy-in from the
public, Professor Henning recommends that prosecutors track charging deci-
sions according to race and neighborhood and provide community represent-
atives and other stakeholders with an opportunity to review those decisions
for disparate impact.  Finally, to ensure that communities of color are able to
respond to adolescent offending without state intervention, Professor Hen-
ning contemplates a more expansive role for prosecutors who will engage
school officials and community representatives in the identification and de-
velopment of adequate community-based, adolescent-appropriate alternatives
to prosecution.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last quarter century, psychological research has shown
that much of youth crime and delinquency is the product of normal
adolescent development.1  Compared to adults, adolescents often
make impetuous and ill-considered decisions, are susceptible to nega-
tive influences and outside pressures, and have a limited capacity to
identify and weigh the short- and long-term consequences of their
choices.2  As most youth mature, however, they age out of delinquent
behavior and rarely persist in a life of crime.3  Because children and
adolescents are more malleable and amenable to rehabilitation than
adults, the Supreme Court has recognized youth as a mitigating factor
in the disposition of even the most serious criminal behavior by ado-
1 See discussion infra Part I.D.1.
2 See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 37–40
(2008) (noting that adolescents are more susceptible to peer influences, more likely to
discount the future, and more likely to engage in activities perceived to be dangerous);
Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 555–56
(2000) [hereinafter Scott, Adolescence] (stating that adolescents’ “inexperience and imma-
ture judgment may lead them to make poor choices”).
3 See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Devel-
opmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 1009, 1014 (2003) [hereinafter Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty].
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lescents.4  Most notably, in Roper v. Simmons in 2005, Graham v. Florida
in 2010, and Miller v. Alabama in 2012, the Supreme Court relied upon
developmental research to conclude, respectively, that the death pen-
alty is categorically inappropriate for youth under the age of eigh-
teen,5 the sentence of life without the possibility of parole is too severe
for youth convicted in nonhomicide cases,6 and a mandatory sentence
of life without the possibility of parole in homicide cases is impermissi-
ble because it denies youth the opportunity to present mitigating evi-
dence concerning their development.7
Ironically, the developmental research seems to have had little
effect in reversing the pervasive overreliance on law enforcement offi-
cials and juvenile courts when responding to typical adolescent behav-
iors, particularly among youth of color.  Whereas school officials were
once willing to address normal adolescent misconduct through coun-
seling and other in-school interventions, school officials now routinely
rely on police officers to manage student discipline.8  A typical
schoolyard fight is labeled as a felony assault, and students who play
“catch” with a teacher’s hat are charged with robbery.9  While teach-
ers, law enforcement officers, and ultimately prosecutors are rightly
concerned about public safety, youth accountability, and compensat-
ing victims for their harms, these concerns are too often addressed
with law enforcement strategies that ignore scientifically supported
conclusions about adolescent offending and diminished culpability.
These strategies also disregard more effective, community-based alter-
natives to prosecution that are more likely to ensure adolescents’ suc-
cessful transition to adulthood.
There is little dispute that racial disparities pervade the contem-
porary American juvenile justice system.  Although black youth com-
prised only 16% of all youth in the United States from 2002 to 2004,
they accounted for 28% of all juvenile arrests, 37% of detained youth,
34% of youth formally processed by the juvenile court, 35% of youth
judicially waived to criminal court, and 58% of youth sent to adult
state prison.10  The persistent overrepresentation of youth of color in
the juvenile justice system is consistent with empirical evidence that
racial stereotypes negatively affect judgments about adolescent culpa-
4 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467–68 (2012) (murder in the course
of arson); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032–33 (2010) (armed burglary with assault
or battery); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 557, 572–73 (2005) (murder).
5 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568–70.
6 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27, 2030.
7 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–66.
8 See Aaron Kupchik & Torin Monahan, The New American School: Preparation for Post-
Industrial Discipline, 27 BRIT. J. SOC. EDUC. 617, 620–21, 623–24 (2006) (discussing the in-
creased presence of police in schools and their growing role in student discipline).
9 See infra note 264 and accompanying text. R
10 See infra note 145 and accompanying text. R
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bility, maturity, risk of recidivism, and deserved punishment.11  This
Article posits that the juvenile justice system treats youth of color
more harshly than their white peers in part because decision makers
throughout the system are less inclined to recognize their develop-
mental immaturity.  Although the juvenile justice process as a whole
needs reform, this Article focuses specifically on the role of prosecu-
tors at the charging phase and contends that prosecutors have a
unique responsibility as gatekeepers of juvenile court jurisdiction to
correct racial disparities in the system by filtering out illicit and im-
plicit bias and applying the findings of developmental psychology eq-
uitably to all youth in the charging decision.
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I reviews recent find-
ings in the study of normative adolescent development and considers
how society’s understanding of adolescence has shaped law and policy
since the inception of the first juvenile courts.  Part II recognizes that
society has always tolerated some disruptive, and even delinquent, ad-
olescent behavior without formal state intervention and without signif-
icant cost or threat to public safety.  However, as is evident in data
documenting the disproportionate arrest and prosecution of youth of
color, state actors appear particularly unwilling to excuse and tolerate
adolescent misconduct by black and Hispanic youth.  Part II identifies
factors that may be creating disparities in police and prosecutorial de-
cision making and contends that distinctions in normative adolescent
development or amenability to treatment across race or class cannot
explain racial disparities in the system.  Drawing from contemporary
research on implicit bias, including the most recent studies on the
impact of race on perceptions of adolescent culpability, Part II con-
tends that contemporary narratives portraying youth of color as dan-
gerous and irredeemable fuel pervasive fear of these youth and cause
prosecutors to disproportionately reject developmental immaturity as
a mitigating factor for their misconduct.
Part III seeks to improve prosecutorial decision making and re-
duce the prosecution of youth of color for low- to midlevel offenses
that would likely be excused or handled informally if they were com-
mitted by white youth in middle-class communities.  To ensure fair-
ness, equity, and efficacy in the charging decision, Part III
recommends that prosecutors collaborate with developmental experts
and community representatives to draft intake and charging standards
that challenge distorted notions of race and maturity, are informed by
research in adolescent development, and provide a fair and equitable
11 See Patricia Soung, Social and Biological Constructions of Youth: Implications for Juvenile
Justice and Racial Equity, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 428, 437 (2011) (citing Sandra Graham &
Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 483, 499 (2004)).
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framework for identifying those youth who should be diverted from
juvenile court intervention.  More important, Part III challenges pros-
ecutors to derationalize racially coded decision making by recognizing
that even when neighborhood effects and social structures produce
opportunities for more serious and frequent crime among youth of
color, prosecutors have a duty to evaluate and respond to that behav-
ior with the same developmentally appropriate options so often availa-
ble to white youth.
To increase transparency and accountability to the public, stan-
dards should require prosecutors to track charging decisions by race
and neighborhood and encourage community representatives and
other stakeholders to periodically review those decisions for disparate
impact.  To achieve and sustain reforms, prosecutors must change the
culture from the top down, resist external pressures to react punitively
to high-profile juvenile crime, and challenge faulty public perceptions
of mature and dangerous youth of color.  Finally, to ensure that com-
munities of color are equipped to address adolescent offending with-
out state intervention, Part III recommends that prosecutors work
with policymakers and community representatives to identify and de-
velop a continuum of community-based, adolescent-appropriate alter-
natives to prosecution.
I
CRIMINALIZING NORMAL ADOLESCENT BEHAVIOR:
CONCEPTIONS OF YOUTH AND ADOLESCENCE IN
THE EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURTS
A. The Progressives’ Vision of Youth and Adolescence
Though adolescent deviance has existed in American society as
long as social norms have, the concept of juvenile delinquency did not
emerge until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when
the United States began its transition from a largely rural, agrarian
society to an urban, industrial nation.12  An emerging view of child-
hood and adolescence as distinct developmental stages accompanied
America’s transformation into an urban society.13  With the recogni-
tion of these developmental stages, youth were treated as “vulnerable,
innocent, passive, and dependent beings who needed extended prep-
aration for life,” and parents were given “a greater responsibility . . . to
supervise their children’s moral and social development.”14  These
evolving views of childhood coincided with an ideological acknowl-
12 GEOFF K. WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY & JUVENILE JUSTICE
23 (2012).
13 Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 693–94
(1991) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation].
14 Id. at 694.
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edgement of the rehabilitative potential of all offenders and contrib-
uted to reforms in the criminal justice system.15  Progressive reformers
of the late nineteenth century believed that professionals could diag-
nose the causes of crime and “treat” offenders whose behavior was the
product of external forces.16  Children were significant beneficiaries
of this new rehabilitative ideal.
A group of Progressive reformers, commonly referred to as
“Child Savers,” who were particularly concerned about the welfare
and development of children, established juvenile courts based on the
assumption that children were less culpable than adults and more re-
sponsive to rehabilitation.17  The reformers intuitively understood
that children were physically, mentally, and morally different from
adults and that society should respond to their behavior accordingly.18
Assuming that youth lacked the capacity for moral and reasoned judg-
ment19 and concluding that much of adolescent misconduct was the
product of environmental factors beyond their control,20 reformers
advocated for the justice system to divert youth offenders from the
traditional criminal justice system to newly established juvenile courts
that would “rescue” them from their negative home environments and
transform them into responsible citizens.21  Reformers believed that
15 See id.
16 See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court—Part II: Race and the “Crack
Down” on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 335–36 (1999) [hereinafter Feld, Transforma-
tion Part II].
17 See David S. Tanenhaus, Degrees of Discretion: The First Juvenile Court and the Problem of
Difference in the Early Twentieth Century, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN 105, 107 (Darnell
F. Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005) (citing Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile
Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909)).  For an alternative account of the history of
juvenile courts as a response to fear of poor children in newly urbanized cities, see infra
Part II.A.
18 Tanenhaus, supra note 17, at 107 (discussing Progressives’ call to find out where R
children were in each of these categories).
19 See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Childhood, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE 113, 117 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Scott, Childhood]
(noting that juvenile court founders believed that children lacked “the capacity for reason-
ing, moral understanding, and judgment on which attributions of blameworthiness must
rest”).
20 See Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent
Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 125,
127–31 (2007) (discussing the view that children are not predisposed to committing bad
acts and such behavior must be due to the influence of adults); Elizabeth S. Scott &
Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Re-
form, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 141–42 (1997) (discussing the view that criminal
conduct was believed to be the “symptom of an underlying condition . . . caused by poor
parental guidance, care and supervision as well as social harms associated with poverty”).
21 Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP
Sentences, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 11, 16 (2007) [hereinafter Feld, Unmitigated Punishment]; see
also Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative
“Backlash,” 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1456–58 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Race, Politics, and
Juvenile Justice] (discussing Progressives’ view of juvenile courts as a “therapeutic agency”);
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children, like adult offenders, could be diagnosed and cured of un-
derlying conditions that lead to delinquency.22
The paternalistic philosophy of the new juvenile court allowed
staff to address both criminal and noncriminal behavior such as
“smoking, sexual activity, truancy, immorality, or living a wayward,
idle, and dissolute life.”23  The Progressives created agencies to incul-
cate delinquent youth with middle-class values and help them become
moral, law-abiding citizens.24  The emphasis on rehabilitation also led
reformers to advocate for flexible and indeterminate sentences aimed
at reforming young offenders.25  As such, judges in the early juvenile
courts had broad discretion and convened informal hearings with
flexibility in the application of due process standards and confidenti-
ality protection that shielded youth from public stigma.26  Flexibility
allowed paternalistic judges to engage youth face-to-face27 and to
“fashion individualized treatments” that served the best interests of
the child.28 Progressives described the new juvenile courts as “benign,
nonpunitive, and therapeutic” and claimed that probation officers
would try to diagnose and cure delinquent youth, rather than punish
them.29  Procedural formalities, such as the right to counsel, the right
Scott & Grisso, supra note 20, at 141–44 (discussing historical focus on inadequate parent- R
ing and social harms of poverty as causes of adolescent criminal behavior); Elizabeth S.
Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 804–05 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth] (describing the belief that juvenile courts could “redi-
rect[ ]” delinquents); Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 143, 146 (2003) (noting Progressives’ view of adolescents as misguided and
“likely to benefit from treatment and intervention”).
22 Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187,
1189 (1970).
23 Feld, Transformation Part II, supra note 16, at 337–38. R
24 See Feld, Transformation, supra note 13, at 693; see also WARD, supra note 12, at 30–33 R
(tracing the impact of the idea of juvenile social control on juvenile justice).
25 Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 21, at 1459–60. R
26 Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools and
Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 525–38 (2004) [hereinafter
Henning, Eroding Confidentiality] (reviewing the history of confidentiality in juvenile
courts); Mack, supra note 17, at 117 (describing the relationship between the juvenile court R
and its charges as “not so much [about] the power, as the friendly interest of the state”);
David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Century: Beyond the
Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 42, 43 R
(discussing founders’ intent to shield youth from “stigmatizing publicity”).
27 See Mack, supra note 17, at 119–20; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1967) R
(noting that the early conception of the juvenile court envisioned a “fatherly judge
touch[ing] the heart and conscience of the erring youth by talking over his problems
[and] by paternal advice and admonition”); WARD, supra note 12, at 78 (noting that a R
judge in Cook County, Illinois described the separate juvenile court as acting as a “kind
and just parent ought to treat his children” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
28 Tanenhaus, supra note 17, at 110; see Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra R
note 21, at 1459–60 (noting that judges tailored sentences to match a child’s best R
interests).
29 Feld, Transformation, supra note 13, at 694–95. R
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to jury trials, and adherence to the rules of evidence, were deemed
unnecessary since juvenile courts were not meant to punish.30
B. Due Process and the Diminishing Relevance of Adolescence
The Progressives’ assumptions about youth and the rehabilitative
vision of juvenile court prevailed at least in theory until the 1960s,
when advocates began to question the state’s commitment to rehabili-
tation and the lack of procedural protections for accused youth.31
The “flexibility” and “informality” that were once championed as
hallmarks of the rehabilitative mission of the early juvenile courts
came under attack during the Due Process Revolution of the Civil
Rights Era, when proponents of due process complained that the rhet-
oric of rehabilitation was a mask for punishment imposed without
necessary procedural safeguards.32  Critics of the modern juvenile
court characterized the court as a “coercive instrument[ ] of social
control through which the state oppressed the poor and minorities.”33
Thus, it is no surprise that juvenile justice reforms became a signifi-
cant part of the Supreme Court’s broader effort to protect the rights
of racial minorities.34
By necessity, proponents of due process have been less concerned
with preserving early conceptions of adolescence and have sought to
equate delinquency proceedings with criminal trials in order to secure
additional procedural protections.35  Some advocates have gone so far
as to call for the abolition of juvenile courts.36  Although the Supreme
Court was unwilling to require states to abandon the juvenile court
30 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15; Richard Kay & Daniel Segal, The Role of the Attorney in
Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Non-Polar Approach, 61 GEO. L.J. 1401, 1402–03 (1973).
31 Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 21, at 1482–89. R
32 See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (discussing the need for due
process in the characteristically informal juvenile court); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
365–66 (1970) (same); Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 21, at 1480–94 R
(discussing the expansion of procedural safeguards for juveniles during the “Due Process
Revolution” of the civil rights era).
33 Feld, Transformation Part II, supra note 16, at 347. R
34 Id. at 345.
35 See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to Critics of Juve-
nile Court Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927, 941–44 (1995) [hereinafter Ainsworth, Youth
Justice].
36 See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The
Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1118–32 (1991) [hereinafter
Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood] (calling for abolition of the juvenile courts and urging
criminal courts to treat youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing); Ainsworth, Youth Justice,
supra note 35, at 948–51 (same); Katherine Hunt Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: R
A Proposal for the Preservation of Children’s Legal Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23, 25 (1990)
(same); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sen-
tencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 69 (1997) (same).
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“experiment”37 altogether, it did acknowledge concerns about due
process in Kent v. United States and again in In re Gault, when it con-
cluded that juvenile court was the “worst of both worlds,” providing
neither the individualized rehabilitation promised to youth nor the
procedural rights afforded to adults.38 Gault ultimately guaranteed
youth accused of a crime a number of constitutional protections (but
not all of the protections afforded adults): the right to timely notice of
charges, the right to counsel, the right to confront witnesses, and the
right against self-incrimination.39  In subsequent cases, the Court re-
quired that the prosecution prove allegations of delinquency beyond
a reasonable doubt40 and extended the ban on double jeopardy to
delinquency adjudications.41
Following the procedural victories in Gault, the absence of juries
in juvenile courts was the next target for procedural justice advocates
who believed that even proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not
enough to constrain the bias and discretion of juvenile court judges at
the adjudicatory phase.42  Because jurors bring diverse backgrounds
and perspectives to the case, scholars have argued that deliberation
among multiple jurors improves the integrity of the adjudicatory pro-
cess by exposing and correcting prejudices through the interactive ex-
change of ideas.43  The advocates’ call for jury trials posed a direct
37 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544 (1971) (plurality opinion) (referring
to the creation of the juvenile court as an “experiment”).
38 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 n.23 (1967) (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
556 (1966)). But see McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543–50 (discussing the Court’s unwillingness to
abandon the juvenile court experiment despite disappointment in the juvenile court
system).
39 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 41, 55, 57–58 (declining to rule on whether juveniles
have a right to appeal); see also Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges,
Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
553, 558–62 (1998) (detailing the Court’s decision in Gault to recognize some rights for
juveniles but not others).
40 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
41 See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528–31 (1975).
42 See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence
Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1145 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Constitutional Tension] (noting
that the juvenile court would benefit from a jury’s check against the unequal administra-
tion of justice as well as racial bias); cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)
(acknowledging that juries may provide an important safeguard against “the compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge”).
43 See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 39, at 578–82 (citing studies showing that R
members of a group commonly “reconsider and change even the firmest of prejudgments”
as they begin to understand and appreciate different viewpoints and values); see also Gayle
W. Hill, Group Versus Individual Performance: Are N+1 Heads Better Than One?, 91 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 517, 535 (1982) (discussing studies that have shown that group performance was
generally “qualitatively and quantitatively superior to the performance of the average indi-
vidual”). But see Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Mapping the Racial Bias of the White Male
Capital Juror: Jury Composition and the “Empathic Divide,” 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 69, 92 (2011)
(finding that, contrary to expectations, differences in the way black and white defendants
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-2\CRN203.txt unknown Seq: 11  2-JAN-13 14:13
2013] CRIMINALIZING NORMAL ADOLESCENT BEHAVIOR 393
challenge to the special treatment afforded to children and adoles-
cents in the early juvenile courts.  In declining to find a federal consti-
tutional right to jury trials for accused youth in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court expressed concern that jury trials
would threaten the rehabilitative mission of the juvenile justice system
and destroy the “intimate, informal protective” character of the pro-
ceedings.44  Ironically, advocates who favor jury trials often ground
their argument in a belief that juvenile courts have already lost their
original mission.45  When the Kansas Supreme Court held that its state
constitution guaranteed juveniles the right to jury trials notwithstand-
ing McKeiver, it expressly found that the state’s juvenile court system
had lost its “benevolent parens patriae character” and that few distinc-
tions were left between the contemporary juvenile and criminal justice
systems.46  In light of these dwindling distinctions, procedural justice
advocates have been willing to abandon many of the features of juve-
nile court in their quest for due process.47
Confidentiality has been another recurring target of the due pro-
cess agenda.  Critics have challenged the long tradition of confidenti-
ality in juvenile courts as providing cover for unethical judicial
conduct and allowing juvenile court actors to believe they are immune
from scrutiny and accountability.48  Advocates for public oversight be-
lieve that media access to hearings and records will hold judges ac-
are treated are more divided after deliberations, showing that strong punitive and likely
biased opinions were accentuated rather than moderated in a deliberative setting).
44 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 540–41, 545, 547 (1971) (plurality opin-
ion) (finding neither a Sixth Amendment nor a due process right to jury trial for youths
facing delinquency proceedings).
45 See Gerald P. Hill, II, Revisiting Juvenile Justice: The Requirement for Jury Trials in Juve-
nile Proceedings Under the Sixth Amendment, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 143, 160–67 (2008) (argu-
ing the right to a jury trial should be extended to juvenile proceedings because the juvenile
justice system is not in fact rehabilitative); Sandra M. Ko, Note, Why Do They Continue to Get
the Worst of Both Worlds? The Case for Providing Louisiana’s Juveniles with the Right to a Jury in
Delinquency Adjudications, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 161, 189–90 (2004) (arguing
that the current system impedes rehabilitation but that a jury system would better advance
it by improving procedural fairness).
46 In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 170 (Kan. 2008) (emphasis added).
47 See, e.g., Henning, Eroding Confidentiality, supra note 26, at 530 (noting that reform- R
ers in the 1960s argued for reduced confidentiality and increased scrutiny of the juvenile
courts as a check on racism and ineffective counsel); Hill, supra note 45, at 162–63 (argu- R
ing that because the juvenile court is not fulfilling its ideals, notions of individualized jus-
tice should be abandoned in favor of stricter due process protections, including jury trials);
Ko, supra note 45, at 191–95 (arguing that Louisiana’s juvenile justice system has already R
become a punitive model akin to the adult system, and therefore features such as confiden-
tiality and vast judge discretion should be replaced with the jury as a check on the system
and in the interest of accurate fact-finding).
48 See, e.g., Perry L. Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids: An Equal
Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 306–08 (2008) (noting that the
confidential nature of juvenile court proceedings shields decision makers from accounta-
bility and fosters inequity); Michele Benedetto Neitz, A Unique Bench, a Common Code: Evalu-
ating Judicial Ethics in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 130 (2011) (pointing out
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countable to the community’s moral conscience and improve the
courts’ integrity by providing a check on corrupt practices, including
racism and bias.49  Confidentiality remains a source of considerable
debate, even among child advocates and scholars committed to ado-
lescent-appropriate responses to juvenile delinquency.  Many scholars,
including myself, have long supported confidentiality to shield youth
from the stigma of a juvenile record and its collateral consequences.50
This perspective is buttressed by claims that the media too often sensa-
tionalizes high-profile juvenile violence, rather than challenging ineq-
uities and protecting the rights of the accused child.51  With legitimate
arguments on both sides of the confidentiality debate and the Su-
preme Court’s express declination to interfere with the states’ right to
maintain the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings,52 states differ in
their approach to the issue.  Juvenile court proceedings in most states
remain closed to the public, but states often allow public access to
juvenile records that involve arrests or adjudications for serious
offenses.53
Despite the Supreme Court’s hope that states could fairly accom-
modate both rehabilitation and due process, that accommodation
that the wide discretion given to judges in the “private world of juvenile court” leaves much
room for unethical judicial conduct).
49 See United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353, 1357–58 (3rd Cir. 1994); Steven A. Drizin &
Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV.
257, 308–09 (2007); Gordon A. Martin, Jr., Open the Doors: A Judicial Call to End Confidential-
ity in Delinquency Proceedings, 21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 393, 400–01
(1995); Moriearty, supra note 48, at 299. R
50 Henning, Eroding Confidentiality, supra note 26, at 527–30; Ellen Marrus,“That Isn’t R
Fair, Judge”: The Costs of Using Prior Juvenile Delinquency Adjudications in Criminal Court Sentenc-
ing, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1323, 1353 (2004); Leila R. Siddiky, Note, Keep the Court Room Doors
Closed so the Doors of Opportunity Can Remain Open: An Argument for Maintaining Privacy in the
Juvenile Justice System, 55 HOW. L.J. 205, 222–31 (2011).
51 Cf. RICHARD A. MENDEL, LESS HYPE, MORE HELP: REDUCING JUVENILE CRIME, WHAT
WORKS—AND WHAT DOESN’T 29–30 (2000) (discussing the media’s increasing coverage of
juvenile crime despite its decline).
52 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25 (1967) (noting that due process does not prohibit
states from continuing to provide for confidentiality of police and court records regarding
juveniles); cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (plurality opinion) (“We
are reluctant to disallow the States to experiment further . . . and we feel that we would be
impeding that experimentation by imposing the jury trial.”). But see Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308, 319–20 (1974) (holding that a juvenile confidentiality statute cannot interfere
with defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses in order to establish bias).
53 E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-129 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (presumptively closed pro-
ceedings, but allow judges to open proceedings to interested parties); D.C. CODE § 16-
2316(e) (LexisNexis 2001) (same); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.070(3) (West 2006) (same);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169–B:34 (Supp. 2012) (mandatory closed proceedings); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78A-6-114(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2008) (open hearing for specific enumerated
offenses); N.J. CT. R. 5:19-2(a)(1) to (a)(2) (presumptively closed proceedings, but allow
judges to open proceedings to interested parties); OHIO JUV. R. 27(A)(1) (LexisNexis
2011) (open hearings for “serious youthful offender proceedings”); see also Henning, Erod-
ing Confidentiality, supra note 26, at 536–37 (discussing confidentiality statutes). R
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proved difficult to achieve.  At the end of the Due Process Revolution,
the United States was left with a crippled juvenile justice system that
tried, without much success, to accommodate at least two competing
goals: procedural justice and rehabilitation.  The challenges facing
the evolving hybrid were compounded in the late 1980s and 1990s
when victims’ advocates and law-and-order politicians forced account-
ability, punishment, and victims’ rights into the juvenile court debate.
C. The Loss of Adolescence in the Era of Law-and-Order Politics
Beginning in the Civil Rights Era and continuing into the twenty-
first century, American juvenile courts witnessed a gradual shift from
their early treatment-oriented focus to a punishment-oriented system
that paid greater attention to the nature and number of the youth’s
prior and pending allegations.54  Amid policymaker skepticism about
the viability of rehabilitation, especially in the 1990s,55 increased me-
dia attention to public safety, the demand for youth accountability,
and the campaign for victims’ rights eroded rehabilitative responses
to adolescent behavior.56  In the late 1980s and 1990s, state legisla-
tures throughout the country passed punitive laws to address juvenile
delinquency in response to false public perceptions of high and rising
crime rates.57  Politicians attacked notions of childhood, hoping to
54 Feld, Transformation Part II, supra note 16, at 340 (discussing causes of shifting phi- R
losophy during the “turbulent 1960s”).
55 See Ralph A. Rossum, Holding Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America’s “Juvenile Injus-
tice System,” 22 PEPP. L. REV. 907, 907–09, 918–20 (1995) (contending that serious juvenile
crime was soaring while the public’s confidence in the juvenile justice system’s effective-
ness was plummeting, and advocating for a “justice model” in juvenile court that relies on
proportional and determinate dispositions and increased offender accountability); Scott &
Grisso, supra note 20, at 137, 148–49; Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 21, at R
799–800, 805; Arthur R. Blum, Comment, Disclosing the Identities of Juvenile Felons: Introduc-
ing Accountability to Juvenile Justice, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 349, 363–72 (1996) (describing the
erosion of faith in the ability of the juvenile justice system to rehabilitate juvenile criminals
successfully). But see Mark W. Lipsey, Can Rehabilitative Programs Reduce the Recidivism of
Juvenile Offenders? An Inquiry into the Effectiveness of Practical Programs, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
611, 611–16, 640 (1999) (discussing how meta-analysis of the efficacy of rehabilitative pro-
grams shows these programs can reduce recidivism rates).
56 Kristin Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?: Retributive Versus
Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1107, 1112–15 (2009) [hereinafter Hen-
ning, Victims’ Rights] (detailing the punitive-policy wave of the 1980s and 1990s); Scott &
Grisso, supra note 20, at 141–53 (discussing the shift from the rehabilitative era to the due R
process era to the “get tough” era).
57 See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 21, at 806–10; see also MENDEL, supra R
note 51, at 29–37 (discussing an increased public fear of juvenile crime during the 1980s R
and 1990s, resulting from representations by the media and public officials despite an
actual decrease in juvenile crime); HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OF-
FENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 127 (2006) (reporting that between 1994
and 2003 there were substantial declines in arrests for overall juvenile violent crime (32%),
murder (68%), forcible rape (25%), robbery (43%), and aggravated assault (26%), and
noting that declines were proportionately greater for juveniles than for adults); David S.
Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, “Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused”: The Changing Legal
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garner support for this new approach.  As Bob Dole declared in 1996,
“A violent teenager who commits an adult crime should be treated as
an adult in court and should receive adult punishment.”58  Similarly,
the district attorney for Ventura County, California wrote in an op-ed
supporting California’s Proposition 21 that the state’s “juvenile courts
too frequently focus their precious resources on violent and repeat
juvenile felons, many of whom are gang-involved, often without any
realistic likelihood of achieving rehabilitation.”59
Legislators amended statutes to require that youths be tried in
adult court at younger ages and for more offenses.60  New statutes al-
lowed judges to impose harsher penalties, such as lengthy periods of
incarceration in state facilities, mandatory minimum sentences, and
blended-sentencing schemes that required youth to spend time in
both juvenile and adult prisons.61  Additionally, policymakers en-
dorsed collateral consequences such as sex-offender registration, DNA
data banking, eviction from public housing, and exclusion from pub-
lic schools.62  More explicitly, legislators amended juvenile court pur-
pose clauses to incorporate the new goals of youth accountability,
public safety, victims’ rights, and, on occasion, punishment.63  Even
where juvenile courts preserved the treatment rhetoric, policies
Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 642–43 (2002) (discussing
data that casts doubt on the validity of the perception of an increase in youth violent
crime).
58 Dole Seeks to Get Tough on Young Criminals, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 1996, at A16.
59 Michael D. Bradbury, Op-Ed., More Tools Are Needed to Curb Juvenile Crime, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 29, 2000, at B7 (discussing Proposition 21, which would allow youth who com-
mit certain enumerated felonies to be tried in adult court); see also Tom Gorman, In Law’s
Eyes, 14-Year-Old Is an Adult, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1995, at A1 (quoting San Diego County
District Attorney Paul Pfingst as saying, “No community can celebrate prosecuting 14-year-
olds as adults for murder, but it’s something we have to do because of the types of crimes
they’re committing.  I don’t know that there’s an alternative but to hold them responsible
by adult standards.”).
60 See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 59 (noting that California changed its law to reduce R
the age of transfer from sixteen to fourteen at a time when the number of children com-
mitting murder was ballooning around the nation).
61 Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 21, at 1558–68 (discussing waiver R
laws and harsher sentences in juvenile courts after the 1980s); Moriearty, supra note 48, at R
308 (observing the increase of mandatory minimum sentencing).
62 See Henning, Eroding Confidentiality, supra note 26, at 537–38, 542–76; see also R
Jonathan Kimmelman, Risking Ethical Insolvency: A Survey of Trends in Criminal DNA
Databanking, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 209, 210, 219 (2000) (listing twenty-six states with laws
that include juveniles in DNA collection); Suzanne Meiners-Levy, Challenging the Prosecution
of Young “Sex Offenders”: How Developmental Psychology and the Lessons of Roper Should Inform
Daily Practice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 499, 505 (2006) (addressing the political climate leading to
the harsh prosecution of juvenile sexual offenders and the requirement to register).
63 Henning, Eroding Confidentiality, supra note 26, at 1113–15 (surveying changes in R
juvenile court purpose clauses); Hill, supra note 45, at 165–66 (discussing changing pur- R
pose clauses involving a shift from rehabilitative to punitive juvenile court).
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adopted in the name of rehabilitation are often punitive in practice.64
Punitive practices in the “law-and-order” era suggest that policymakers
lost sight of the reformers’ earlier recognition of the immaturity and
malleability of youth.
D. The Age of Science and the Revival of Adolescence
1. Developmental Psychology and Adolescent Brain Science
Psychological research in adolescent development over the last
twenty-five years has confirmed much of what the early reformers as-
sumed and seems to have paved the way for the revival of adolescence
as an important factor in the response to juvenile delinquency.  Stud-
ies tracking the normative, cognitive, and psychosocial development
of youth have consistently found significant deficiencies in adolescent
decision-making capacities, especially in the fast-paced, emotionally
charged settings common to adolescent offending.65  Generally, the
capacity to reason and understand develops progressively from
preadolescence through the late-teen years.66  Research in cognitive
development indicates that youth in early adolescence have difficulty
conceptualizing future consequences.67  Many youth simply lack the
knowledge and experience needed to reason through the short- and
long-range consequences that an individual should contemplate in
any decision.68  More recent studies in neurological development
have confirmed that the brain structures responsible for logical rea-
soning, planning, self-regulation, and impulse control are the last to
mature and develop.69  Thus, youths’ capacity to critically assess the
64 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Segadelli, Note, Minding the Gap: Extending Adult Jury Trial
Rights to Adolescents While Maintaining a Childhood Commitment to Rehabilitation, 8 SEATTLE J.
FOR SOC. JUST. 683, 695–99 (2010) (pointing out the changes in Washington State’s juve-
nile code, making it more punitive in the name of rehabilitation).
65 See Dustin Albert & Laurence Steinberg, Judgment and Decision Making in Adolescence,
21 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 211, 216–20 (2011); Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents
Less Mature than Adults? Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged
APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 586 (2009) [hereinafter Steinberg et al., “Flip-
Flop”]; Jennifer L. Woolard & N. Dickon Reppucci, Researching Juveniles’ Capacities as Defend-
ants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 173, 176–79
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
66 See Scott & Grisso, supra note 20, at 157–58. R
67 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from Developmental
Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 65, at 291, 303–05 [hereinafter Scott, Criminal R
Responsibility].
68 See Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DE-
VELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 351–52 (1992); Melinda G. Schmidt et al., Effectiveness of Participa-
tion as a Defendant: The Attorney-Juvenile Client Relationship, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 175, 177
(2003) (noting this deficiency and its potential effect in the context of juvenile offenders’
relationships with their attorneys); Scott, Adolescence, supra note 2, at 547, 555–56, 591 (not- R
ing that inexperience and immature judgments may lead to poor choices).
69 See Brief for the American Medical Association and the American Academy of Child
and Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 14–36, Miller v.
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consequences of their actions improves with age—in part because
their base of knowledge grows and in part because the cognitive skills
necessary to process and learn from their experience improve.
Social, emotional, and temporal perceptions and judgments that
mature during a youth’s psychosocial development may further hin-
der a youth’s cognitive capacity.70  Significantly, cognitive and
psychosocial abilities do not develop at the same rate.71  Research
shows that cognitive deficiencies begin to abate by late adolescence,
such that by the age of fifteen or sixteen, youth have cognitive abilities
similar to adults in controlled settings.  Youths’ psychosocial deficien-
cies, however, persist well into late adolescence and even early adult-
hood.72  Deficiencies in psychosocial development tend to cause
youth to underestimate the risks involved in a given course of con-
duct, focus heavily on the present while failing to consider the future,
and encounter difficulty regulating their emotions and controlling
their conduct.73  Empirical studies assessing youths’ capacity for self-
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) (collecting and summarizing
studies); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and
Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 812 (2005) [hereinafter Scott & Grisso, Develop-
mental Incompetence].  Some scholars have cautioned against relying on neuroscientific find-
ings to support arguments for reduced culpability for juvenile offenders. See Terry A.
Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 89, 116–18 (2009) (warning that neuroscientific findings have generally been vulnera-
ble to inaccurate conclusions by legal advocates, and that an emphasis on neuroscience
inevitably raises autonomy and equality concerns); Soung, supra note 11, at 441–43 (ex- R
pressing concern that misinterpretation and misapplication of adolescent neuroscience
may fuel notions of racial inferiority and perpetuate racial bias).  Notwithstanding these
concerns and the relative recency of these studies in developmental neurology, others con-
tend that “[t]here is incontrovertible evidence of significant changes in brain structure and
function during adolescence” and “there is already strong consensus among developmen-
tal neuroscientists about the nature of this change.”  Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science
of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy?, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 739, 742 (2009).
70 See Scott, Adolescence, supra note 2, at 555–56. R
71 See id. at 560.
72 Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 459, 466–68 (2009); Steinberg et al., “Flip-Flop,” supra note 65, at 586. R
73 See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 21, at 813–16; see also Elizabeth R
Cauffman et al., Age Differences in Affective Decision Making as Indexed by Performance on the
Iowa Gambling Task, 46 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 193, 206 (2010) (concluding that deci-
sion making and risk assessment improves throughout adolescence due to affective
processing rather than cognitive maturation); Bonnie L. Halpern-Felsher & Elizabeth
Cauffman, Costs and Benefits of a Decision: Decision-Making Competence in Adolescents and
Adults, 22 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 257, 265, 268 (2001) (finding adolescents less
likely than adults to identify long-term consequences, evaluate risks and benefits, and ex-
amine possible alternative options); Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Ori-
entation and Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV. 28, 38–39 (2009) [hereinafter Steinberg et al.,
Future Orientation] (finding that adolescents are particularly attuned to immediate rewards
and tend to discount long-term consequences); Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty, supra note 3, R
at 1009, 1012 (finding that, compared to adults, adolescents place less weight on risk than
reward).  For additional studies, see Brief for the American Psychological Association et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6–30, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)
(Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) [hereinafter Brief for APA, Miller].
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regulation also reveal that adolescents score significantly lower than
adults on measures of “temperance,” “impulse control,” and “suppres-
sion of aggression.”74  Adults tend to make better decisions than ado-
lescents given their capacity to remain focused on long-term goals and
resist social and emotional influences.75
Developmental research further indicates that youth “are
more . . . responsive to peer influence than are adults.”76  As empirical
evidence demonstrates, peer presence makes youth significantly more
likely than adults to take risks and engage in antisocial behavior, with
susceptibility to peer pressure peaking around age fourteen and then
declining slowly during late adolescence.77  The fear of rejection and
desire for approval from peers help explain why delinquency is more
common in adolescence and why adolescents are more likely than
adults to engage in illicit behavior in groups.78
Given the gap between cognitive and psychosocial development,
it is plausible that a fifteen-year-old boy would have the cognitive abil-
ity to understand—in a conversation with his father—that robbery is
wrong yet impulsively participate in such conduct with a group of
friends who snatch a stranger’s hat and run away.79  Psychosocial fea-
tures of adolescence, such as susceptibility to peer influence, a desire
to save face and maintain loyalty to friends, and impulsivity driven by
fear and adrenaline, may prevent the fifteen-year-old from engaging,
in the heat of the moment, in a logical analysis of the long-term conse-
74 Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence:
Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 748–49, 754 tbl.4
(2000) [hereinafter Cauffman & Steinberg, (Im)maturity] (emphasis omitted); see Laurence
Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and
Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1764, 1774–76
(2008) [hereinafter Steinberg et al., Sensation Seeking].
75 See Albert & Steinberg, supra note 65, at 219–20 (suggesting that adults’ ability to R
resist social and emotional influences and focus on long-term goals explains why they make
more “adaptive decisions” than do adolescents); see also Adriana Galvan et al., Risk-Taking
and the Adolescent Brain: Who Is at Risk?, 10 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. F8, F9–F13 (2007) (finding
that impulse control continues to develop throughout adolescence and early adulthood);
Rotem Leshem & Joseph Glicksohn, The Construct of Impulsivity Revisited, 43 PERSONALITY &
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 681, 684–86 (2007) (reporting significant decline in impulsivity
from ages fourteen to twenty-two).
76 SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 38. R
77 See id.; Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk
Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 626–34 (2005); Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn C.
Monahan, Age Differences in Resistance to Peer Influence, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1531,
1538–39 (2007).
78 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 38–39; Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited R
and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV.
674, 686–88 (1993).
79 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 38–39 (discussing group crime among ado- R
lescents); Scott, Adolescence, supra note 2, at 560 (stating that cognitive and psychosocial R
abilities develop at different rates).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-2\CRN203.txt unknown Seq: 18  2-JAN-13 14:13
400 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:383
quences of his actions.80  Reckless behavior, including the delinquent
activity described here, is so common among adolescents that it has
been described as “virtually a normative characteristic of adolescent
development.”81  Incidents of both minor delinquency and more seri-
ous violent crime “peak sharply” in adolescence and “drop precip-
itously in young adulthood.”82
Although delinquency is common in adolescence,83 not every ad-
olescent violates the law.  The transition to a healthy, safe, and pro-
ductive adulthood depends on a number of variables, including the
youth’s environmental context and social supports.84  Even among
those youth who do engage in delinquency, most are “adolescensce-
limited” offenders who age out of delinquent behavior by late adoles-
cence; few go on to become “life-course-persistent” offenders as
adults.85  As youth grow and mature, their cognitive and psychosocial
capacities improve and their sense of self-identity evolves.86  Over
time, youth develop the skills they need to process information and
think in hypotheticals.87  As they transition into adulthood, youth are
also less likely to make impulsive, peer-driven decisions as they acquire
new values, learn to resist peer pressure, and begin to understand and
control their emotions.88  Because adolescence is a time when youth
experience significant and rapid growth in their capacities, positive
changes in a youth’s family, school, or community are likely to have
80 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 39 (stating that the desire for approval and R
fear of rejection affect an adolescent “even without direct coercion” from his or her peer
group); Albert & Steinberg, supra note 65, at 219–20 (describing adolescents’ inability to R
focus on long-term consequences).
81 Arnett, supra note 68, at 344, 350–51 (noting that at least 50% of adolescents report R
partaking in unprotected sex, illegal drug use, drunk driving, or some form of minor crimi-
nal activity).
82 See Moffitt, supra note 78, at 675 (discussing crime rates among various age groups, R
including crimes of homicide, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault).
83 See Arnett, supra note 68, at 344. R
84 See He Len Chung et al., The Transition to Adulthood for Adolescents in the Juvenile
Justice System: A Developmental Perspective, in ON YOUR OWN WITHOUT A NET: THE TRANSITION
TO ADULTHOOD FOR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS 68, 73–85 (D. Wayne Osgood et al. eds.,
2005); Scott & Grisso, supra note 20, at 154, 156, 188; Gregory M. Zimmerman, Impulsivity, R
Offending, and the Neighborhood: Investigating the Person–Context Nexus, 26 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 301, 325–29 (2010).  For an additional discussion of how environmental fac-
tors influence healthy adolescent transition to adulthood, see infra Part II.C.2.
85 Moffitt, supra note 78, at 685–86; see SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 54–56. R
86 See Scott & Grisso, supra note 20, at 157–58; Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty, supra R
note 3, at 1014; see also Brief for APA, Miller, supra note 73, at 19 (discussing brain develop- R
ment in adolescence).
87 Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 21, at 812 n.54. R
88 See Brief for APA, Miller, supra note 73, at 19–21; Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, R
supra note 21, at 816. R
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considerable corrective influence on the youth’s development.89  As a
result, the vast majority of youth who engage in criminal or delin-
quent behavior—including serious offenders—desist from crime
when they mature.90
2. Adolescent Development and the Supreme Court
The revival of adolescence as a relevant and important period of
behavioral development for juvenile and criminal law may have found
its greatest support in the Supreme Court.  The developmental re-
search reviewed here has had a remarkable impact on the evolution of
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding minors’ culpability in the
criminal justice system.  The Court first considered this research in
2005 when it concluded in Roper v. Simmons that sentencing a minor to
death constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.91  The Court relied
upon developmental research again in 2010, in Graham v. Florida,
when it held that sentencing a youth to life without the possibility of
parole is unconstitutional in nonhomicide cases,92 and in 2012, in
Miller v. Alabama, when it held that mandatory life sentences were in-
appropriate for youth in homicide cases.93  In each of these cases, the
Court highlighted three key differences between juveniles and adults
that justify differential treatment of juveniles in the criminal courts.
First, the Court recognized that juveniles’ immaturity and susceptibil-
ity to negative influences means “their irresponsible conduct is not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”94  Second, the Court found
that youths’ “vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their
immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than
adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their
whole environment.”95  Third, the Court concluded that because
youth are still forming their identities, “it is less supportable to con-
clude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence
89 Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Develop-
mental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 389, 393
(1999).
90 See Brief for APA, Miller, supra note 73, at 33; Moffitt, supra note 78, at 685–86; see R
also Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty, supra note 3, at 1014–15 (describing how and why adoles- R
cents outgrow criminality).
91 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).
92 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
93 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 n.5 (2012).
94 Roper, 543 U.S. at 561 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988));
see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (“[T]ransient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to
assess consequences . . . lessen[ ] a child’s ‘moral culpability’ . . . .”); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at
2026–27 (arguing that “[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the
failings of a minor with those of an adult” (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570)).
95 Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting)).
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of irretrievably depraved character.”96  To the contrary—as the Court
accepted in Roper, Graham, and Miller—juveniles are “more capable of
change than are adults,” and courts cannot reliably classify them
among the worst offenders.97
Addressing the principles of retribution and deterrence, the Gra-
ham Court concluded that minors are categorically less deserving of
retribution than adults and recognized that the very features of ado-
lescence that make youth less culpable also make them less susceptible
to deterrence.98  Because youth are often unable to control their im-
pulses or hypothesize about the potential consequences of their ac-
tions, harsh penalties are unlikely to deter them.99  Likewise, lengthy
periods of pretrial detention or long-term residential placements after
disposition may be inappropriate if most youth are amenable to reha-
bilitation and will likely mature out of crime.100  The net result of the
Court’s analysis is a presumption of diminished capacity and amena-
bility to rehabilitation that has mitigated criminal responsibility and
eroded the most serious consequences for youth charged as adults in
the criminal justice system.
3. Preserving Adolescence and Seeing Our Way Forward
We are clearly at a turning point in the juvenile court’s history.
Given the sustained validation from both developmental research and
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the role of adolescence in criminal jus-
tice policy and practice is on firmer footing than ever before and may
be here to stay.  State legislatures and decision makers are only just
now beginning to revisit the juvenile justice legislation of the 1990s.
Thus far, state legislatures and decision makers’ efforts have largely
concentrated on reversing or tempering juvenile transfer laws and
other particularly harsh criminal sanctions.101  Fewer efforts have
96 Id. (recognizing juveniles’ malleable nature and potential for maturation).
97 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; see Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465–66; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
98 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027–29.
99 See id. at 2028–29; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571–72; see also Brief for APA, Miller, supra note
73, at 34 n.79 (discussing studies showing that the threat of adult criminal sanctions had no R
deterrent value on juvenile delinquency).
100 See Moriearty, supra note 48, at 306 (arguing that pretrial detention is usually inef- R
fectual and damaging); Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 21, at 837–38 (noting R
that long-term incarceration may not be necessary, as most youths mature out of antisocial
behavior).
101 See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5–130(1)(a) (West Supp. 2012) (limiting
the mandatory transfer of youth over fourteen to enumerated serious offenses); Engrossed
Substitute S.B. 5746, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009) (repealing automatic transfer stat-
ute enacted in 1994 and prohibiting the transfer of youths under the age of fifteen except
for murder and aggravated assault); S. & H.R. B. 1196, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn.
2007) (amending section 46b–120 of Connecticut General Statutes to raise the age of juve-
nile court jurisdiction from sixteen to eighteen); see also CONN. JUVENILE JURISDICTION PLAN-
NING & IMPLEMENTATION COMM., FINAL REPORT 2–4 (2007), available at http://www.ncdjjdp.
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been made to apply the developmental research to the low- and
midlevel offenses that pervade juvenile courts today.102
Even before the Supreme Court’s recent Eighth Amendment rul-
ings, very few convicted youths faced the severe sentences of death or
life without the possibility of parole in adult courts, and today, most
young offenders are prosecuted in juvenile courts across the coun-
try.103  Moreover, most juvenile court referrals involve nonviolent of-
fenses and misdemeanors; for example, 84% of juvenile arrests in
2008 involved property offenses, simple assault, and nonviolent
crimes.104  Nowhere has the increase in low- to midlevel juvenile court
referrals been more evident than in school-based referrals.105  Al-
though schools were once willing to handle normal adolescent mis-
conduct through time-outs, counseling, and other in-school
interventions, schools now routinely employ school resource officers
(SROs) to monitor hallways and manage even the least offensive ado-
lescent behavior.106
The prevalence of minor, low-impact offenders in juvenile courts
today reflects society’s continued unwillingness to tolerate “normal”
org/resources/youthAccountabilityTaskForce/systemCosts/connecticut.pdf (citing re-
search on the immaturity of juveniles as a basis for raising the age of juvenile court
jurisdiction).
102 See infra notes 336–47 and accompanying text for discussion of school offense R
protocols.
103 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023 (noting that only 109 juvenile offenders were serving
sentences of life without the possibility of parole for nonhomicide offenses); Roper, 543
U.S. at 566–68; Barbara Kaban & James Orlando, Revitalizing the Infancy Defense in the Con-
temporary Juvenile Court, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 33, 50–51 (2007) (pointing out that even
though waiver to adult court is a growing concern, out of the 2.2 million youths who were
under eighteen and arrested in 2003, 71% of those eligible were referred to juvenile court,
while only 7% were referred to criminal court).
104 C. Puzzanchera et al., Easy Access to FBI Arrest Statistics: 1994–2009, OFF. JUV. JUST. &
DELINQ. PREVENTION, www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/asp/ucr_display.asp (last visited Nov.
6, 2012).  In 2008, only 16% of juvenile arrests were for murder, forcible rape, aggravated
assault, and robbery. See id.  Although nonviolent offenses make up the majority of of-
fenses in juvenile court, see id., juvenile arrest and commitment rates rose beginning in the
1970s, peaked in the 1990s, and subsequently fell, albeit not to the previous rate. See Jef-
frey Fagan & Aaron Kupchik, Juvenile Incarceration and the Pains of Imprisonment, 3 DUKE F.
FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 29, 31–32 (2011).  The number of youth adjudicated, committed,
and placed in residential placement across the country has decreased since the late 1990s
from 76,600 in 1999 to 47,062 in 2010.  M. Sickmund et al., Easy Access to the Census of
Juveniles in Residential Placement: 1997–2000, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, http://
ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/selection.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2012) (select “Adjudi-
cated, placed here”; then select “Show Table”).  The number of youth convicted in crimi-
nal court, however, has risen from 1,235 in 1999 to 1,365 in 2010.  M. Sickmund et al., Easy
Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement: 1997–2000, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ.
PREVENTION, www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/State_Offense.asp (last visited Nov. 6,
2012).
105 See infra Part II.B for a discussion of data regarding school-based referrals to juve-
nile courts.
106 See Kupchik & Monahan, supra note 8, at 617, 620–21 (noting the increase in the R
use of SROs in schools since 1990 and the reasons behind the increase).
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adolescent misconduct—particularly among poor youth of color.107
One cannot understand contemporary juvenile justice policies and
practices without examining the impact race and class have on the
American conception of adolescence.  Before considering the prose-
cutors’ role in juvenile justice reform, the next Part examines how
race influences juvenile justice referrals and charging decisions.  Part
II contends that socioeconomic disparities and harmful narratives
about youth of color contribute to the overrepresentation of black
and Hispanic youth in juvenile courts, especially for low- and midlevel
offenses.
II
THE INTERSECTION OF RACE AND ADOLESCENCE
IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
(E-RACING ADOLESCENCE)
The historical evolution of adolescence is only part of the
Progressives’ story.  A more complete narrative considers the impact
of race and class on the development of American juvenile justice and
suggests that the Progressives’ motives were not entirely altruistic.
Many revisionist accounts of this history have argued that the Progres-
sive agenda was always one of social control, and that reformers de-
signed child welfare agencies and juvenile courts to protect their
middle-class existence and control poor immigrants—and later peo-
ple of color.108  Today, disparities in the treatment of poor youth of
color persist notwithstanding similarities in the normative develop-
ment of youth across all ethnicities and socioeconomic classes.109
A. Race and Class in the Early Juvenile Court
From its inception, the juvenile court has operated as an institu-
tion for “other,” nonmainstream youth living outside of the middle-
class ideal.110  The American transformation into a modern industrial-
ized society brought with it an influx of immigrants from southern
and eastern Europe who “crowded into ethnic enclaves and urban
ghettoes.”111  Even before the first juvenile court opened in Chicago
in 1899,112 the upper- and middle-class Anglo-Protestant Western
Europeans, who had arrived a few generations earlier, sought to assim-
107 See, e.g., Kenneth B. Nunn, The Child as Other: Race and Differential Treatment in the
Juvenile Justice System, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 679, 681–82, 706–07 (2002) (discussing the juve-
nile justice system’s disparate treatment of African American children).
108 See infra notes 110–27 and accompanying text. R
109 See infra Part II.B.
110 See Nunn, supra note 107, at 704–06. R
111 Feld, Transformation Part II, supra note 16, at 332. R
112 Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 53, 63
(2012).
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ilate the poor immigrants into “sober, virtuous, middle-class Ameri-
cans like themselves.”113  The Child Savers treated poverty like a crime
and blamed poor parents for their children’s delinquent behavior and
conditions.114  As some scholars have argued, the Progressives deliber-
ately constructed the juvenile court to discriminate against and con-
trol poor immigrants and provide coercive measures to distinguish
between “our children” and “other people’s children.”115
The “enlightenment” of the American juvenile justice system
peaked during a period that spanned from the final years of slavery to
the Progressive Era reforms of 1920.116  Early juvenile justice reform-
ers did not initially contemplate the rehabilitation and “citizen-build-
ing” of “Negro” children, and instead, focused their efforts on
“normaliz[ing]” or “whiten[ing]” European immigrant youth deemed
neglected and delinquent.117  Reformers only admitted boys who were
deemed salvageable to the first child welfare facilities,118 while black
children, who were viewed as a “perennial ‘lost cause’ . . . lacking the
physical, moral, and intellectual capacity on which normalization
would depend,” did not benefit from the Child Saver efforts.119  Dur-
ing slavery, Southern plantation owners viewed black children as prop-
erty to be disciplined, controlled, and nurtured into docile and
productive adult laborers.120  Slave masters, rather than the state, typi-
cally whipped or used other forms of corporal punishment to disci-
pline disobedient black children.121  After Emancipation, delinquent
black children in the South faced convict leasing, lynching, and other
forms of physical abuse.122  When some refuge homes for wayward
children finally opened their doors to black children, they relegated
113 Feld, Transformation Part II, supra note 16, at 332–34; see WARD, supra note 12, at 73; R
Fox, supra note 22, at 1188–92. R
114 See Birckhead, supra note 112, at 62. R
115 Feld, Transformation Part II, supra note 16, at 339–40. R
116 WARD, supra note 12, at 38. R
117 Id. at 38–39, 86–87.  For an excellent summary of the disparate treatment and de-
nial of rehabilitative services to children of color during the Child Saver Era, see Robin
Walker Sterling, Still at the Back of the Bus: In re Gault and the Unfinished Due Process Revolu-
tion in Juvenile Justice, 72 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 10–29), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2079767; see also JAMES BELL &
LAURA JOHN RIDOLFI, W. HAYWOOD BURNS INST., ADORATION OF THE QUESTION: REFLEC-
TIONS ON THE FAILURE TO REDUCE RACIAL & ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM 3 (Shadi Rahimi ed., 2008) (“From the earliest days of our nation, segregationist
policies dictated that the detention of youth of color would be different than that of
[w]hite youth . . . .”).
118 See Fox, supra note 22, at 1191. R
119 WARD, supra note 12, at 39, 52–53, 60, 86–87. R
120 Id. at 35.
121 Id. at 50, 60, 62 (noting that it was unusual for enslaved youth to be subject to state
sanction and that “plantation discipline took care of the disobedient Negro child” (quot-
ing ROBERT M. MENNEL, THORNS & THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
1825–1940, at 75 (1973))).
122 WARD, supra note 12, at 63–70, 98–102. R
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the black children to the “colored section” and denied them rehabili-
tative services, which were was seen as a waste of resources for black
youth.123  While these homes provided white youth with academic ed-
ucation and training to be farmers and skilled artisans, black boys re-
ceived little if any recreation, education, and moral instruction, and
were instead trained to meet the labor needs of the day, which were
largely agricultural and other forms of manual labor.124  Likewise,
black girls were trained to be cooks, maids, and seamstresses.125
As European immigration came to an end after World War I,126
black youth eventually displaced poor white immigrants as the youth
population disproportionately involved in court proceedings.  Thus,
what started as a means to control poor immigrant youth later
morphed into a racially motivated system of isolation and control as
white immigrants assimilated into society.127  In the years between
Emancipation and World War II, many newly freed blacks migrated
from the rural South to the urban North in search of work in the
North’s industrial factories.128  With the influx of Southern blacks,
Northern whites reacted with fear and hostility and forced blacks into
segregated urban ghettos.129  However, in comparison to their South-
ern counterparts, the Northerners were more willing to accommodate
black youth in the segregated and dilapidated facilities of the juvenile
justice system where the youth could remain under the control of the
parental state.130  As to be expected, juvenile justice in the North was
marked by discrimination, and as in the South, the scarcity of facili-
123 Id. at 53–56; see BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 117, at 3. R
124 WARD, supra note 12, at 56–58, 74. R
125 Id. at 56, 74.  Black boys learned “how to handle the hoe, shovel and spade; to
manage horses, mules and cattle, to plow, to sow, and to reap,” and black girls learned “to
scrub, wash, and iron, to bake and cook; [and] to wait upon the family.”  Id. at 74 (citing
HOUSE OF REFORMATION FOR COLORED CHILDREN, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, 1875, at 7 (Bal-
timore Price Current Printing, 1875)).  Although this Article’s scope is limited to the his-
torical treatment of black youth, it is important to note that this country’s powerful elite
subjected other youth of color to similar treatment.  Most notably, disobedient Native
American children faced labor and confinement for their purported transgressions in the
nineteenth century. BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 117, at 5.  At the same time, the federal R
government established Indian boarding schools and relied on missionaries to “civilize”
Native youth with the English language, Christianity, and other European values. Id.
(quoting WARD CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN, SAVE THE MAN: THE GENOCIDAL IMPACT OF
AMERICAN INDIAN RESIDENTIAL SCHOOLS (2004)).
126 Feld, Transformation Part II, supra note 16, at 340–41. R
127 See Tanenhaus, supra note 17, at 108–10; see also Nunn, supra note 107, at 706 (dis- R
cussing how society’s perception of black youth as “others” leads to disproportionate treat-
ment by the juvenile justice system).
128 See WARD, supra note 12, at 79, 106–07; see also Feld, Transformation Part II, supra R
note 16, at 340–42 (discussing the demand for black southern laborers to work in northern R
industrial factories after World War I).
129 See Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 21, at 1464; Feld, Transformation R
Part II, supra note 16, at 343–45. R
130 See WARD, supra note 12, at 110–14. R
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ties, apprenticeship opportunities, and resources that would serve
black youth undermined any hope for rehabilitation.131  White juve-
nile justice reformers were no more invested in citizen-building for
black youth in the North than their counterparts were in the South.132
Disparities in the incarceration of black children have been docu-
mented since the nineteenth century.  In the years before the first
juvenile court—when delinquent children were still prosecuted in
criminal courts—legislators excluded black children from criminal
laws, recognizing that courts should not hold youth under fourteen as
responsible for their actions as adults.133  In one study published in
1850, black youth were significantly overrepresented in adult prisons
in Providence, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C.134  Furthermore, be-
cause juvenile courts evolved slowly, especially in rural parts of the
country, jurisdictions continued to subject many youths to adult prose-
cution long after the first juvenile court opened.135  Between 1900 and
1959, the State executed at least 162 persons eighteen years old or
younger after adult criminal proceedings, with nearly 70% of those
executions involving black youth.136  Even in Chicago, where the first
juvenile court was established, a 1913 study found that although
blacks represented less than 3% of Chicago’s population, black boys
and men made up 12% of the jail population, while black girls and
women made up nearly 33% of the female jail population.137  Records
indicate that by 1927, black Americans constituted only 7% of Chi-
cago’s population, but accounted for 22% of the juvenile court
caseload.138  These early disparities were evident across the nation
through the 1940s and were a precursor to the even larger disparities
of today.139
In the 1960s, a rise in juvenile crime, and an increase in social
disorder caused by racial unrest in particular, led politicians to call for
131 Id.
132 See id.
133 Id. at 48–50, 62.
134 BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 117, at 4 (citing Cecile P. Frey, The House of Refuge for R
Colored Children, 66 J. NEGRO HIST. 10, 17 (1981)).
135 WARD, supra note 12, at 83. R
136 Id. at 116–20.
137 Id. at 85, 88–90 (discussing additional disparities in the institutionalization of black
youth, native youth, and immigrant white youth across the country).
138 Id. at 84.
139 See BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 117, at 8 (discussing Mary Huff Diggs’s review of R
fifty-three courts across the country in the 1940s and her findings that “Negro children
[we]re represented in a much larger proportion of the delinquency cases than they [we]re
in the general population,” that “[c]ases of Negro boys were less frequently dismissed than
were white boys,” and that black boys “were committed to an institution or referred to an
agency . . . much more frequently than were white boys” (quoting Mary Huff Diggs, The
Problems and Needs of Negro Youth as Revealed by Delinquency and Crime Statistics, 9 J. NEGRO
EDUC. 311, 313–16 (1940))).
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“law-and-order” measures rather than rehabilitative responses to ado-
lescent offending.140  By the end of the 1980s, the appearance of crack
cocaine in the inner city, the prevalence of guns among youth of
color, and the rapid increase in homicides involving black youth had
exacerbated the push for “get tough” responses to juvenile crime.141
Casting the “crime problem” as primarily a poor, black male problem,
politicians targeted black men and “exploited . . . racially tinged per-
ceptions [of crime] for political advantage.”142  Black youth, who the
media and conservative politicians demonized, became the prime
targets of the war on crime and the war on drugs.143  Today, broad
and imprecise juvenile court purpose clauses have multiple and com-
peting goals—ranging from rehabilitation to victims’ rights, public
safety, and accountability—that allow police officers, probation staff,
and judges to hide illicit motives and subconscious racial bias behind
whatever state interest is most politically salient at the time.144
B. Race and Adolescence in Contemporary Juvenile Courts
More than one hundred years after the first juvenile court
opened its doors, disparate treatment of youth of color continues to
define juvenile courts across the country.  Considering the scope of
racial disparities in the juvenile justice system today, it would be easy
to conclude that mechanisms of social control are still at work to keep
children of color in their assigned place in society.  At every decision
point in the system, statistics show that black youth are more likely to
experience harsher dispositions and penetrate further into the system
than white youth.  As documented by the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency, while African Americans comprised only 16% of all
youth in the United States from 2002 to 2004, they accounted for 28%
of all juvenile arrests, 30% of juvenile court referrals, 37% of detained
youth, 34% of youth formally processed by the juvenile court, 30% of
adjudicated youth, 35% of youth judicially waived to criminal court,
38% of youth in residential placements, and 58% percent of youth
sent to adult state prison.145  In 2009, 57% of youth under the age of
140 Feld, Transformation, Part II, supra note 16, at 340, 345–46. R
141 Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 21, at 1507. R
142 Id. at 1518.
143 Id. at 1523; see also Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias and Legal Decision-
making, 69 MD. L. REV. 849, 870–73 (2010) (surveying media treatment of black youth and
crime in the 1990s).
144 For a survey of contemporary juvenile court purpose clauses and a discussion of
how victims’ rights allow for racial bias, see Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim
Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 362, 406–07 (1996); see also Henning, Victims’
Rights, supra note 56, at 1112–14, 1118–22, 1143 (summarizing changes in purpose clauses R
across the country).
145 NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT OF YOUTH OF COLOR IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2007).
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eighteen in the United States were white, 22% were Hispanic, 15%
were African American, 5% were Asian, and 1% were American In-
dian.146  Yet, African American youth made up 31% of all youth ar-
rested in that year, an arrest rate nearly twice that of white youth.147
Black youth have also been disproportionately represented in de-
tention and other out-of-home placements.  Although the proportion
of juvenile cases involving detained youth fluctuated between 1985
and 2008, the volume of cases grew generally, with a 41% increase in
the total number of cases involving detained youth over the twenty-
four-year period.148  Cases involving black youth in detention, how-
ever, experienced an 85% increase during that period, while cases in-
volving white youth in detention saw only a 19% increase.149  Data
from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention shows
that for every 100,000 youth living in the United States on October 24,
2007, 279 were held in a long-term residential placement facility for
some delinquent offense.150 That average conceals significant racial
disparities.  For every 100,000 black youth in the United States, 738
were in a residential facility on that date.151  For American Indian
youth, that number was 477; for Hispanic youth, 305; for non-His-
panic white youth, 157; and for Asians, 75.152  As one might expect,
racial disparities persist for the most serious consequence of delin-
quency—transfer to adult court.  National data are only available for
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction by judicial transfers and do not
account for jurisdictional waivers by statutory exclusion of designated
offenses or by statutes that grant prosecutors unchecked discretion to
transfer accused youth.153  In 2005, 7,000 youth were transferred by
judicial waivers; 39% of these youth were black.154  Although black
youth were only 13% more likely than whites in that year to be judi-
cially waived to adult court, this relative rate index likely underesti-
mates the racial disparities of youth transferred since judicial waiver
represents only a small portion of youth tried in the adult system.155
According to 2008 statistics, Hispanic children were 43% more likely
146 Easy Access to Juvenile Populations: 1990–2011, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION,
www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezapop (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
147 HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ARREST IN THE UNITED STATES,
1980–2009, at 22 (2011).
148 Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics: 1985–2009, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVEN-
TION, www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezajcs (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
149 Id.
150 Sickmund et al., supra note 104. R
151 Statistical Briefing Book, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.
gov/ojstatbb/corrections/qa08203.asp?qaDate=2007 (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
152 Id.
153 NEELUM ARYA & IAN AUGARTEN, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, 2 CRITICAL CONDI-
TION: AFRICAN-AMERICAN YOUTH IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 25 (2005).
154 Id.
155 Id.
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than white youth to be waived to the adult system and 40% more likely
to be admitted to adult prison.156  Native youth were 1.5 times more
likely than white youth to receive out-of-home placement and 1.5
times more likely to be waived to the adult criminal system.157
The intersection of race and the waning tolerance of adolescence
has been especially vivid in school-based arrests.  Recently, school offi-
cials have been among the least willing to tolerate “normal” adoles-
cent misconduct, as evident in the tremendous increase in referrals of
youth from public schools to juvenile courts.158  Whereas schoolteach-
ers, principals, and school counselors once handled school-based inci-
dents such as fighting, disorderly conduct, and destruction of
property in school, school officials now rely on local police or in-
house SROs to handle even the most minor of school infractions.159
In 2005, 68% of students in the United States between ages twelve and
fifteen reported the presence of security guards or assigned police of-
ficers in their schools, an increase from 54% in 1999.160  In North
Carolina, the number of SROs has nearly doubled over the last dec-
ade; in Texas, 163 school districts now have their own police depart-
ments.161  Statistics reveal that in some states, such as North Carolina,
close to 40% of juvenile court referrals come from schools.162  In
Pennsylvania, the number of school-based arrests has almost tripled in
just seven years.163  In Florida, there were 21,289 arrests and referrals
of students to the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice in the
2007–2008 academic year; almost 15,000 of them—or 69%—were for
misdemeanor offenses.164  In North Carolina, schools made 16,499 de-
linquency referrals to juvenile court in the 2008–2009 year.165  In Col-
orado, schools made 9,563 referrals to law enforcement in the
156 NEELUM ARYA ET AL., CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, 3 AMERICA’S INVISIBLE CHIL-
DREN: LATINO YOUTH AND THE FAILURE OF JUSTICE 6 (2009).
157 NEELUM ARYA & ADDIE C. ROLNICK, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, 1 A TANGLED WEB
OF JUSTICE: AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE YOUTH IN FEDERAL, STATE, AND TRIBAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS 8 (2008).
158 See, e.g., M. Lynn Sherrod et al., Childish Behavior; Criminal Behavior, HUNTSVILLE
TIMES, June 1, 2008, at A23 (noting that referrals from Clayton County schools skyrocketed
from 36 in 1995 to 264 in 1998 when police officers were stationed in schools, and to 1,262
in 2003).
159 See id. (noting that “referrals for misdemeanors like disorderly conduct spiked out
of control”).
160 ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT: HOW “ZERO TOLERANCE” AND
HIGH-STAKES TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 15 (rev. 2010).
161 Id.
162 Donna St. George, Judge Steve Teske Seeks to Keep Kids with Minor Problems Out of Court,
WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/judge-steve-
teske-seeks-to-keep-kids-with-minor-problems-out-of-court/2011/09/21/gIQA1y8ZsL_
story.html.
163 ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 160, at 18–19. R
164 Id.
165 Id.
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2006–2007 academic year.166  In both North Carolina and Colorado,
the vast majority of the referrals were for relatively minor offenses.167
The increase in referrals from schools to juvenile courts has dis-
proportionately affected youth of color.168  For example, in Florida,
black students were 2.5 times as likely as white students to be arrested
and referred to the state’s Department of Juvenile Justice in the
2007–2008 academic year.169  In Colorado, black students were more
than twice as likely as white students to be referred to law enforce-
ment, while “Latino students were 50% more likely than [w]hite stu-
dents to be referred.”170  In Philadelphia, “a [b]lack student was three-
and-a-half times more likely to be taken into police custody than a
[w]hite student,” and “a Latino student was 60% more likely to be
taken into police custody than a [w]hite student.”171
C. The Root of Racist and Racialized Outcomes
In a well-known scene of the 1986 Hollywood film, Ferris Bueller’s
Day Off, high-school senior Ferris Bueller makes an impassioned plea
to his friend, Cameron, to take his father’s Ferrari for a ride without
permission.172  Eager for excitement, Ferris provides the classic Ameri-
can representation of a risky adolescent adventure.  Although Ferris’s
behavior reflects the same poor judgment, impulsivity, and risk taking
that are endemic to all adolescents, his race, class, and relative isola-
tion from state intervention shield him from the punitive outcomes,
which poor youth of color across the country disproportionately expe-
rience.  This section examines the underlying causes of racial dispari-
ties in the juvenile justice system.
1. “Risky Business” Across the Racial Divide: Controlling for Class
and Ethnicity in the Developmental Research
Differences in normative adolescent development across differ-
ent ethnic or socioeconomic groups cannot explain the overrepresen-
tation of youth of color at every stage of the juvenile justice system.
Studies controlling for socioeconomic status and ethnicity have found
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Heather Cobb, Note, Separate and Unequal: The Disparate Impact of School-Based Refer-
rals to Juvenile Court, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 581, 583–84 (2009); see also Donna St.
George, Black Students Are Arrested More Often, Data Reveal, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2012, at A2
(discussing a U.S. Department of Education study of school systems that have more than
fifty thousand students enrolled and its findings that “African American students repre-
sented 24 percent of enrollment but 35 percent of arrests,” while “[w]hite students ac-
counted for 31 percent of enrollment and 21 percent of arrests”).
169 ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 160, at 18–19. R
170 Id. at 19.
171 Id.
172 FERRIS BUELLER’S DAY OFF (Paramount Pictures 1986).
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similar patterns in developmental features such as impulsivity, sensa-
tion seeking, susceptibility to peer influence, and limited future orien-
tation across all youth groups.173  For example, in one 2010 study,
psychologists found a normative preference among adolescents for
risk taking and short-term reward over long-term gain, with no signifi-
cant differences among ethnicities.174  In another 2009 study, psychol-
ogists controlled ethnicity and socioeconomic class and found that
youth of similar ages exhibited similar levels of weak future orienta-
tion.175 Two major self-report studies on youth violence and drug use,
which document risk taking and delinquency across whites, blacks,
and Hispanics, supplement these findings.176  Where racial disparities
do exist in self-reported data, they do not correspond to the dispro-
portionate representation of youth of color in the juvenile justice
system.177
The University of Michigan and the Center for Disease Control
(CDC) have each separately collected and analyzed youth self-re-
ported data for more than thirty-five years.178  The University of Michi-
gan study has tracked trends from 1975 to 2010, relying on data
collected from around 17,000 middle school students in approxi-
mately 150 middle schools and around 15,000 high-school students in
approximately 130 high schools around the country.179  Overall, self-
report data support the findings of developmental psychologists that
all youth—especially those between the ages of fifteen and nineteen—
173 A number of studies on adolescent development have controlled for race and so-
cioeconomic status, finding no significant differences. See, e.g., Cauffman et al., supra note
73, at 204–06 (showing a preference in adolescents for risk taking and short-term reward R
over long-term gain but no significant differences between ethnicities); Steinberg et al.,
Future Orientation, supra note 73, at 36 (finding that youth of similar ages in the study exhib- R
ited similar levels of weak future orientation when controlling for both ethnicity and socio-
economic status); Steinberg & Monahan, supra note 77, at 1538–39 (finding that patterns R
in resistance to peer influence vary only slightly by ethnicity and socioeconomic status and
generally all groups follow the same basic age pattern in developing resistance to peer
pressure); Steinberg et al., Sensation Seeking, supra note 74, at 1775 (finding that all youth R
have increased sensation seeking and impulsivity across ethnic groups).
174 Cauffman et al., supra note 73, at 200, 204–06. R
175 Steinberg et al., Future Orientation, supra note 73, at 36. R
176 LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., 1 MONITORING THE FUTURE: NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS
ON DRUG USE 1975–2010, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter JOHNSTON ET AL., MONITORING THE FU-
TURE]; Youth Online: High School YRBS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http:/
/apps.nccd.cdc.gov/youthonline (last visited Nov. 6, 2012) [hereinafter CDC].
177 Compare JOHNSTON ET AL., MONITORING THE FUTURE, supra note 176, at 34 (noting R
that white youths report a significantly greater use of certain drugs than African American
youths), with Statistical Briefing Book, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, http://www.
ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/jar.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2012) (indicating that African Ameri-
can youth accounted for just 17% of the total youth population but represented 27% of all
youth arrests for drug abuse violations).
178 JOHNSTON ET AL., MONITORING THE FUTURE, supra note 176, at 9; CDC, supra note R
176. R
179 JOHNSTON ET AL., MONITORING THE FUTURE, supra note 176, at 65. R
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are more likely than adults to engage in dangerous, risk-taking behav-
iors, such as drunk driving, unprotected sex, and drug use.180  Devel-
opmental psychologists attribute the prevalence of risk taking by this
cohort to emotional and cognitive variables that affect decision mak-
ing by youth of all classes and ethnicities.181  The desire and ability to
avoid harm and resist peer influence increase with age, with adults
avoiding harmful or otherwise disadvantageous options at higher rates
than adolescents.182
When the self-reported data is disaggregated by race, statistics re-
veal that African American youth consistently report less drug use
than whites and Hispanics for most types of drugs, but that Hispanics
tend to slightly outpace both African American and white youth de-
pending on the type of drug.  Findings from the 2011 University of
Michigan report are telling:
African-American 12th graders have consistently shown lower
usage rates than [w]hite 12th graders for most drugs, both licit and
illicit.  At the lower grade levels, where few have yet dropped out of
school, African-American students also have lower usage rates for
many drugs, though not all. . . .
In 12th grade, occasions of heavy drinking are much less likely
to be reported by African-American students (13%) than [w]hite
(28%) or Hispanic students (22%).
In 12th grade, of the three racial/ethnic groups, [w]hites tend
to have the highest rates of use on a number of drugs, including
marijuana, salvia, hallucinogens, LSD specifically, hallucinogens
other than LSD, narcotics other than heroin, OxyContin specifi-
cally, Vicodin specifically, amphetamines, Ritalin specifically, Adder-
all specifically, sedatives (barbiturates), tranquilizers, alcohol,
getting drunk, flavored alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, and smoke-
less tobacco.
Hispanics have tended to have the highest usage rate in terms
of annual prevalence in 12th grade for a number of the most dan-
gerous drugs, such as crack, crystal methamphetamine (ice), heroin
in general and heroin with a needle (though in 2009–2010, specifi-
180 See Steinberg et al., Future Orientation, supra note 73, at 39 (noting that youth are R
less oriented to the future than adults across all races); Steinberg et al., Sensation Seeking,
supra note 74, at 1771, 1774 (showing that adolescents across ethnicities experience height- R
ened sensation seeking between the ages of twelve and fifteen and experience heightened
impulsivity throughout adolescence and into early adulthood); CDC, supra note 176 (pro- R
viding statistics on self-reported sexual behavior, drunk driving, and drug use by youth).
181 See generally Albert & Steinberg, supra note 65, at 211, 218–19 (summarizing re- R
search over the past decade confirming adolescent decision-making tendencies, which in-
clude emotional factors, lack of resistance to peer influence, and preference of short-term
rewards over long-term risks).
182 Id. at 218–19.
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cally, [w]hites were highest for heroin use and African Americans
were highest for heroin use with a needle).183
Self-reported data does not correspond with or explain racial dis-
parities in drug arrest rates.  For example, in 2008, African American
youth accounted for just 16% of the total youth population, but repre-
sented 27% of all youth arrests for drug abuse violations184 and were
arrested at almost 1.7 times the rate of white youth for such of-
fenses.185  As such, these rates appear to exaggerate the prevalence of
drug use among black youth and mask the extent of self-reported
drug use among white youth.
Self-report studies also provide evidence that race does not prede-
termine violent offending.  Although African American youth are ar-
rested at much higher rates than white youth for weapons offenses,
self-reported data from the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System
administered by the CDC reveals small differences in weapons of-
fenses between these groups.186  While African American youth ac-
counted for 38% of all youth arrested for a weapons offense in
2008,187 CDC data from that same year revealed that white youth were
almost as likely to report bringing some type of weapon to school as
Hispanic and multiracial youth and slightly more likely to report
bringing a weapon than African American youth.188  African Ameri-
can youth, however, were more likely to bring a gun specifically.189
That same study showed that white youth were more likely than all
other races to report driving while drinking alcohol, and thus were
more likely to put themselves and others in danger on the road.190
African American and American Indian youth were more likely than
white youth to report being in a physical fight at school at least
once.191  Ultimately, while the age of onset, types of violence, types of
183 JOHNSTON ET AL., MONITORING THE FUTURE, supra note 176, at 34–35 (emphasis R
omitted).
184 Statistical Briefing Book, supra note 177. R
185 See id.
186 See CDC, supra note 176. R
187 Charles Puzzanchera, Juvenile Arrests 2008, JUV. JUST. BULL., Dec. 2009, at 9.
188 See CDC, supra note 176 (follow “Unintentional Injuries and Violence”; follow “Car- R
ried a weapon on at least 1 day”; then select column variable “Race” and 2009) (indicating
the percentage of students who carried a weapon at least one day: white, 18.6%; black,
14.4%; Hispanic, 17.2%; multiracial, 17.9%; Asian, 8.4%; American Indian, 20.7%).
189 Id. (follow “Unintentional Injuries and Violence”; follow “Carried a gun on at least
1 day”; then select column variable “Race” and 2009) (indicating the percentage of stu-
dents who carried a gun at least one day: white, 5.8%; black, 7.6%; Hispanic, 5.1%; multira-
cial, 7.2%; Asian, 3.4%; and American Indian 7.6%).
190 Id. (follow “Unintentional Injuries and Violence”; follow “Drove when drinking al-
cohol one or more times”; then select column variable “Race” and 2009) (indicating the
percentage of students who drove when drinking alcohol: white, 10.8%; black, 6.4%; His-
panic, 9.4%; multiracial, 8.6%; Asian, 4.4.%; American Indian, 10.7%).
191 Id. (follow “Unintentional Injuries and Violence”; follow “In a physical fight on
school property one or more times”; then select column variable “Race” and 2009) (indi-
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weapon, and drug preferences may differ across races in self-report-
ing, adolescents of all races engage in risky and delinquent behavior,
and often at rates that call into question racial disparities at arrest.
2. Understanding Neighborhood Effects, Opportunity Structures, and
Deliberate Indifference
Many researchers have offered theories to explain the disparity
between self-report studies and arrest data.  Explanations include the
increased presence of police officers in neighborhoods and communi-
ties where African American and Hispanic youth reside, selective re-
porting of offenses to the police, racial and ethnic bias by police,
victims, and witnesses, and racial and ethnic biases in self-reporting.192
Some researchers challenge self-report studies, claiming that African
American males underreport their involvement in delinquency and
that self-reporting among all groups on serious types of offenses is less
reliable.193  Recent validity and reliability studies, however, suggest
that self-reporting has improved over time and that self-report mea-
sures of delinquency are as reliable as, if not more reliable than, most
social science measures.194
cating the percentage of students who were in a physical fight on school property: white,
8.6%; black, 17.4%; Hispanic, 13.5%; multiracial, 12.4%; Asian, 7.7%; American Indian,
20.7%).
192 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 30 (2001) (citing ALFRED BLUMSTEIN ET AL., COMM. ON RESEARCH ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT & THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL CAREERS AND “CAREER CRIMINALS”
(1986)); Roy L. Austin & Mark D. Allen, Racial Disparities in Arrest Rates as an Explanation of
Racial Disparity in Commitment to Pennsylvania’s Prisons, 37 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 200,
208–14 (2000); Darnell F. Hawkins et al., Race, Ethnicity, and Serious Juvenile Offending, in
SERIOUS & VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS: RISK FACTORS AND SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTIONS
30–33 (Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds., 1998); Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lau-
ritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States, 21 CRIME
& JUST. 311, 330–33 (1997).
193 See D. Wayne Osgood et al., Analyzing Multiple-Item Measures of Crime and Deviance I:
Item Response Theory Scaling, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 267, 272 (2002) (pointing to
the concern that “self-report measures typically over emphasize less serious, and therefore
less important, forms of offending”); Terence P. Thornberry & Marvin D. Krohn, The Self-
Report Method for Measuring Delinquency and Crime, in 4 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 33, 58 (2000) (pro-
viding an historical survey of validity and reliability studies of the self-reporting methodol-
ogy, including those that questioned whether African American males underreport
delinquency).
194 See Thornberry & Krohn, supra note 193, at 58–59. See generally N.D. DEP’T OF PUB. R
INSTRUCTION, DO STUDENTS TELL THE TRUTH ON THE YOUTH RISK BEHAVIOR SURVEY (YRBS)?
(1990), available at http://www.dpi.state.nd.us/health/yrbs/truth.pdf (identifying ways in
which survey design ensures reliable responses, including comparison with other surveys
showing that YRBSs receive similar results, consistency over time, removal of inconsistent
answers on the same answer sheet from the data set, logic within groups of questions,
psychometric studies confirming the validity of the test, logical subgroup differences such
as greater male reported use of smokeless tobacco than female, and a survey environment
ensuring anonymity of students).
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Another hypothesis for the disproportionate representation of
youth of color in the juvenile justice system is that normal adolescent
delinquency may be more visible and even appear more dangerous in
poor communities of color.  Thus, communities may perceive a His-
panic youth who uses crack or crystal meth as engaging in more dan-
gerous behavior than a white youth who uses marijuana.
Communities may perceive a black youth with a gun as more threaten-
ing than a white youth with a knife or an intoxicated youth who drives
a car recklessly in a residential neighborhood.  Similarly, poor youth
who buy and sell drugs in open-air markets where they live are fre-
quently more visible and perceived as more threatening and antago-
nistic to law enforcement officials and the community than wealthier
youth who may engage in drug use and violence in the privacy of their
own homes and clubhouses, or white youth who may visit high-drug
neighborhoods to buy marijuana or heroin and take it home in cars
where they are shielded from police view.195  Theorists have long used
neighborhood effects and opportunity structures like these to explain
disparate offending rates by race.196  Neighborhoods with low collec-
tive cohesion, high residential mobility, extensive legal cynicism, fre-
quent opportunities for offending, and few opportunities for
educational advancement and legitimate wealth accumulation pro-
duce higher rates of delinquency, particularly drug dealing and vio-
lent crime.197  As research demonstrates, the effects of adolescent
195 See Soung, supra note 11, at 436.  In this context, race and class may be inextricably R
intertwined.  Black and Hispanic youth are nearly three times as likely to live in poverty as
non-Hispanic white youth. Statistical Briefing Book, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION,
http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/population/qa01402.asp?qaDate=2010 (last visited Nov. 6,
2012).
196 Heidi E. Grunwald et al., Influences of Neighborhood Context, Individual History and
Parenting Behavior on Recidivism Among Juvenile Offenders, 39 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 1067,
1068–69, 1076 (2010) (discussing social disorganization theory and effects of neighbor-
hood processes on adolescent recidivism, and noting that youths living in environments
with ethnic homogeneity, poverty, and well-organized drug trafficking will easily turn to
illicit activities); Beverly Kingston et al., A Test of Social Disorganization Theory in High-Risk
Urban Neighborhoods, 41 YOUTH & SOC’Y 53, 55–61 (2009) (discussing the history of social
disorganization theory, including neighborhood effects and opportunity structures); Jer-
emy Mennis et al., The Effect of Neighborhood Characteristics and Spatial Spillover on Urban Juve-
nile Delinquency and Recidivism, 63 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 174, 175–76 (2011) (summarizing the
history of the theory of “neighborhood effects” on crime, including the role of neighbor-
hoods in promoting or prohibiting crime and delinquency through cohesion among
neighbors and community-level social control).
197 See generally John P. Hoffmann & Timothy O. Ireland, Strain and Opportunity Struc-
tures, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 263, 266–71 (2004) (discussing “legitimate” oppor-
tunity structures such as education that facilitate the accumulation of wealth and reduce
the risk of crime and “illegitimate” opportunity structures that create both physical and
social opportunities for crime); Michelle Little & Laurence Steinberg, Psychosocial Correlates
of Adolescent Drug Dealing in the Inner City: Potential Roles of Opportunity, Conventional Commit-
ments, and Maturity, 43 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 357, 359–60 (2006) (studying neighbor-
hood effects on urban adolescent drug dealing and noting a rising number of
opportunities for juveniles to sell drugs in urban areas); Ramiro Martı´nez, Jr. et al., Social
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impulsivity are likely amplified in neighborhoods with lower levels of
socioeconomic status and greater opportunities for criminal behavior
and legal cynicism.198  Against this backdrop, a law enforcement deci-
sion to aggressively target open-air drug markets and urban neighbor-
hoods with high rates of crime may reflect a legitimate concern about
the increase in violence that often accompanies the public drug trade
and a genuine desire to make these communities safer rather than any
conscious or subconscious police discrimination.
Nonetheless, rational explanations for arrest and charging deci-
sions cannot absolve state actors of responsibility for racially disparate
outcomes in the juvenile justice system.  Even if the disparate impact
of criminal justice policies on people of color is not the product of
blatant and deliberate racism, it is equally unlikely that such ongoing
disparities are the inadvertent product of innocent decisions made by
those who were ignorant of the likely outcomes.199  As Professor
Michael Tonry claims, it is more likely that policymakers eager to earn
or maintain political reputation are aware that people of color have
been and will be disproportionately affected and do not care.200  As
many others have argued, the disproportionate representation of peo-
ple of color in prisons is the cumulative product of police practices,
legislative decisions, and executive directives that systematically treat
poor people and people of color differently in order to maintain ra-
cial dominance and a hierarchy of white elites across American social,
economic, and legal institutions.201  By opting for punitive “get tough”
Disorganization, Drug Market Activity, and Neighborhood Violent Crime, 43 URB. AFF. REV. 846,
863–64 (2008) (stating that residential instability has “significant and positive direct effects
on rates of aggravated assault”).
198 See Zimmerman, supra note 84, at 301 (finding an interplay between community- R
level explanations for offending and individual traits of impulsivity among adult
offenders).
199 See Michael Tonry, The Social, Psychological, and Political Causes of Racial Disparities in
the American Criminal Justice System, in 39 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 273,
274–75 (Michael Tonry ed., 2010) (contending that “[n]o credible case can be made that
gross racial disparities were unforeseeable”).
200 Id. at 275, 293–300.  Tonry offers three broad explanations for racial disparities in
the criminal justice system, including the psychology of race relations (e.g., contemporary
bias and colorism), whites’ economic, political, and social dominance of blacks to preserve
current racial stratification, and Republican exploitation of racial fears to achieve political
gain. See id. at 280–81.
201 For a history of social policies and practices including contemporary criminal jus-
tice policies and practices that maintain current social stratification of whites over poor
blacks, see DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION
SYSTEM 54, 94, 251 (2007) (examining the history of social stratification and arguing that
crime policy supports white interests); Lawrence D. Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste for
Punishment: Black and White Americans’ Views on the Death Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 DU
BOIS REV. 151, 151–56 (2004) (examining scholars who view changes in U.S. criminal jus-
tice policy as an effort to reassert control and domination over African Americans); Glenn
C. Loury, Race, Incarceration, and American Values, in RACE, INCARCERATION, & AMERICAN
VALUES 3, 36–37 (2008) (examining mass incarceration as a “principal vehicle for the re-
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strategies, including laws that impose harsher legal sanctions on
crack—more prevalent in black communities—than on cocaine,
policymakers perpetuate racial disparities and displace strategies
aimed at correcting structural deprivations and social inequalities that
are more likely to improve public safety in communities of color.202
As Professors Jeffrey Fagan and Tracey Meares argue, public policy
choices that shift “social and economic resources” away from employ-
ment opportunities, education, and neighborhood supports in poor
communities create cynicism and undermine both community cohe-
sion and informal social controls that serve as a natural deterrent to
crime.203
In the juvenile justice context, prosecutors, probation officers,
and judges make collective and individual decisions to impose harsh
legal sanctions on black youth instead of relying on the preventive and
treatment-oriented strategies often available for white youth.204  Not-
withstanding differences in the type of drugs or weapons prevalent in
communities of color, there is no support for a claim that youth of
color will not benefit from developmentally appropriate responses to
adolescent offending.  Thus, given normative research that youth as a
class are more amenable than adults to positive corrective responses
to crime,205 there is no reason to believe that a Hispanic youth who
sells crystal meth is inherently less amenable to rehabilitation than a
production of racial hierarchy in our society”); Tonry, supra note 199, at 274–80 (tracing R
social control and racial stratification from slavery, through Jim Crow, to the war on
drugs); Loı¨c Wacquant, Forum, in RACE, INCARCERATION, & AMERICAN VALUES, supra at 57,
65 [hereinafter Wacquant, Forum] (claiming that “the prison was called upon to help con-
tain a population widely viewed as deviant, destitute, and dangerous”); Loı¨c Wacquant,
From Slavery to Mass Incarceration: Rethinking the ‘Race Question’ in the US, 13 NEW LEFT REV.
41, 41–60 (2002) [hereinafter Wacquant, From Slavery] (arguing that American legal insti-
tutions and social practices have perpetuated patterns of racial dominance and hierarchy
for three centuries).
202 See Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The
Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 176–77, 180
(2008) (discussing the failure of punitive legal sanctions like incarceration to reduce
crime, especially in poor communities of color).
203 Id. at 173, 176, 183–84 (explaining that localized informal social controls such as
work, social status, stigma, marriage, and political participation serve as natural deterrents
or regulators of crime, while more punitive policies of incarceration actually increase
crime); see also Zimmerman, supra note 84, at 325–26 (finding that impulsivity is exacer- R
bated in areas with lower socioeconomic status and collective efficacy and higher levels of
criminal opportunity and moral or legal cynicism).
204 See Fagan & Meares, supra note 202, at 178–79 (noting that “African Americans R
have borne the brunt of law enforcement efforts” to address illegal drug use and traffick-
ing, widening the racial gap in prisoner demographics); Tonry, supra note 199, at 274 R
(noting the emphasis on law enforcement approaches to drug abuse as opposed to preven-
tive approaches).
205 See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text (discussing research indicating that R
most delinquent youth cease to engage in delinquent behavior once they mature); infra
notes 381–85, 424–30 and accompanying text (discussing evidence-based, community- R
based practices that have worked even with serious, violent offenders).
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white youth who sells ecstasy to his friends at home.  A punitive re-
sponse to crystal meth may even do more harm than good if the His-
panic youth perceives punishments to be unjust and inequitable
across races and ethnicities.206  As discussed in the next section, the
denial of rehabilitative options available to youth of color likely re-
flects both explicit and implicit biases about the culpability and matur-
ity of youth of color.
D. Implicit Bias and the Failure to Recognize Developmental
Immaturity in Youth of Color
Class and neighborhood distinctions can only partially explain ra-
cial disparities in the juvenile justice system.  Overemphasizing such
explanations may conceal the impact of negative stereotypes and
harmful narratives about race and crime in America.  As studies have
repeatedly documented, many Americans are predisposed to con-
sciously or subconsciously associate black youth with crime and dan-
gerousness.207  Pervasive stereotypes suggest that youth of color are
prone to violence and crime, are not in school, are unwilling to work,
206 Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 BUFF. L.
REV. 1447, 1479–80 (2009) (summarizing studies on the link between perceived fairness in
the judicial system and recidivism among juveniles and concluding that despite individual
shortcomings in various studies, a link exists between a lack of faith in the judicial system
and higher recidivism rates); Sandra Graham & Colleen Halliday, The Social Cognitive (At-
tributional) Perspective on Culpability in Adolescent Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 65, R
at 345, 354, 358–59 (observing that youth who perceive the legal process as unfair are more
likely to project a negative attitude, which juvenile justice decision makers may read as
“unremorseful” and therefore more culpable); Kristina Murphy & Tom Tyler, Procedural
Justice and Compliance Behaviour: The Mediating Role of Emotions, 38 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 652,
662–65 (2008) (confirming earlier studies that connect people’s perception of fairness
with their willingness to cooperate with authority).
207 See Tonry, supra note 199, at 281–93 (summarizing five strands of psychological R
research documenting the ways in which blackness is associated with crime and danger and
results in more serious punishment for blacks); see also George S. Bridges & Sara Steen,
Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediat-
ing Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554, 561 (1998) (discussing an empirical study in which
probation officers’ narratives about the youth they supervised were analyzed for attribu-
tions of character, likeliness to reoffend, and sentencing, resulting in a finding that officers
view black youth as more likely to reoffend than white youth); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al.,
Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876,
876–93 (2004) (discussing studies that show that black targets are spontaneously viewed as
more criminal); Nicholas Espiritu, (E)racing Youth: The Racialized Construction of California’s
Proposition 21 and the Development of Alternate Contestations, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189, 199–201
(2005) (discussing California polls showing an attribution of a perceived spike in crime
rates to youth of color, an overrepresentation of youth in the media’s representation of
violence, and a de facto assumption of gang membership for youth of color under Califor-
nia’s gang monitoring system); Aliya Saperstein & Andrew M. Penner, The Race of a Crimi-
nal Record: How Incarceration Colors Racial Perceptions, 57 SOC. PROBS. 92, 96 (2010)
(summarizing studies showing an association of blackness with criminality); Scott & Stein-
berg, Blaming Youth, supra note 21, at 809–10 (pointing out that African American youths R
are perceived as “being more mature, more dangerous, and more deserving of punishment
than are comparable white youths”).
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and are likely to be incarcerated at some point in their lives.208  Years
of research on the portrayal of criminals in the media further docu-
ment the imaging of violent offenders and drug dealers as black.209
Consistent with the historical evolution of juvenile court, Profes-
sor Kenneth Nunn discusses the differentiation and rejection of youth
of color as the process of “othering.”210  Child and adolescent behav-
ior that is “cute” in one’s own child becomes frightening and threat-
ening in another person’s child.211 Nunn’s discussion is supported by
numerous studies documenting “people’s tendency to automatically
associate positive characteristics with their ingroups more easily than
outgroups . . . as well as their tendency to associate negative character-
istics with outgroups more easily than ingroups.”212
This Article contends that decision makers, such as police, proba-
tion officers, and prosecutors, treat youth of color more harshly than
white youth in part because of an implicit bias to ignore developmen-
tal immaturity in youth of color.  While few empirical studies explicitly
consider the impact of implicit racial bias on perception of impulsiv-
ity, lack of control, and culpability, two studies conducted by Sandra
Graham and Brian Lowery provide early support for this position and
lay the foundation for additional research.213
In 2004, Graham and Lowery designed two studies to examine
the impact of key decision makers’ unconscious racial stereotyping on
their perceptions of culpability, deserved punishment, and expected
recidivism.214  The researchers hypothesized that widely held stereo-
types that African American youth are “violent, aggressive, dangerous,
and possess adult-like criminal intent” would supersede shared cul-
tural beliefs that adolescence is a “developmental period character-
ized by vulnerability, malleability, and immaturity in judgment.”215
208 See James Bell, Throwaway Children: Conditions of Confinement and Incarceration, in THE
PUBLIC ASSAULT ON AMERICA’S CHILDREN: POVERTY, VIOLENCE AND JUVENILE INJUSTICE 188,
189 (Valerie Polakow ed., 2000); see, e.g., Nicholas K. Peart, Op-Ed., Why Is the N.Y.P.D. After
Me?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at SR6 (discussing the firsthand experience of a young
black man stopped and frisked by the New York Police Department numerous times, some-
times violently, for no apparent reason).
209 Tonry, supra note 199, at 283 (summarizing studies); see also Jerry Kang, Trojan R
Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1550–53 (2005) (discussing ways in which local news
provides data we use to develop opinions about criminal justice policy, including associat-
ing criminality with African Americans).
210 Nunn, supra note 107, at 682, 697, 706. R
211 Id. at 704.
212 Kang, supra note 209, at 1512; see SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 114–15 (dis- R
cussing studies that suggest that African Americans are more likely than whites to favor
leniency toward young offenders); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness:
Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 476 (2010).
213 See Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About
Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 494, 499 (2004).
214 Id.
215 Id. at 485.
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The study sought to determine whether and to what extent uncon-
scious racial stereotypes would influence perceptions of whether a
youth’s criminal behavior was controllable (i.e., volitional and not im-
pulsive) and the result of factors that would likely stabilize over
time.216  The researchers further hypothesized that decision makers
who perceived the causes of the youth’s crime as volitional would be
more likely to infer responsibility, culpability, and blameworthiness by
the youth and decisions makers who perceived the causes of the
youth’s crime as stable would be more likely to expect future criminal
behavior from the youth.217  In both instances, the researchers be-
lieved that the decision makers would endorse harsher punishment
for the youth.218
To test these hypotheses, the researchers conducted two separate
experiments—one with police officers and one with probation of-
ficers.219  The researchers asked participants to first, read a vignette of
a crime allegedly committed by a youth and second, make judgments
and rate the offender on traits reflective of culpability, expected recid-
ivism and deserved punishment.220  None of the participants received
information about the race of the youth in the vignettes, but in some
instances the researchers subconsciously primed the participants
before the vignettes with a series of words commonly associated with
African Americans.221  Consistent with the researchers’ predictions,
the “police officers in the race prime condition judged the hypotheti-
cal offenders to be less immature (i.e., more adult-like)” and more
culpable than did the officers in the neutral prime condition and ulti-
mately endorsed harsher punishments for the youth.222  The
“[p]robation officers in the race prime condition judged the alleged
offender to be less immature and more violent, . . . more culpable,
more likely to reoffend, and more deserving of punishment.”223  Both
experiments involved an ethnically and gender-diverse pool of police
officers and probation officers.224  The participants’ conclusions were
consistent across ethnicity and gender as well as the decision makers’
consciously held prejudices or stated desires to avoid prejudice.225  As
a result, this study supports the conclusion that unconscious racial ste-
reotypes influenced black, white, and Hispanic officers.
216 Id. at 486.
217 Id. at 486–87, 497.
218 Id. at 487.
219 Id. at 488–90.
220 Id. at 495
221 Id.
222 Id. at 493.
223 Id. at 496.
224 Id. at 488, 494.
225 Id. at 499.
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The Graham and Lowery research is unique because it sought to
measure the impact of implicit racial bias on decision makers’ percep-
tions of developmental immaturity and adolescent culpability, which
is central to the philosophy of the juvenile justice system and affects
social consensus on how society should respond to adolescent offend-
ing.226  Their work is buttressed by at least two other studies finding
evidence of bias in perceptions of culpability, risk of reoffending, and
deserved punishment for adolescents when the decision maker explic-
itly knew the race of the offender.227
In 1998, researchers George Bridges and Sara Steen studied 233
narrative reports written by probation officers for judges in anticipa-
tion of a youth’s disposition after a crime.228  The researchers antici-
pated that the narratives would reveal a relationship between the
youth’s race and the probation officers’ perceptions about causes of
the crime, the likelihood of recidivism by the youth, and the sentence
the youth should receive.229  In examining the probation reports for
the cause of crime, the researchers looked for a record of external
(i.e., environmental) versus internal (i.e., personality) influences on
crime and hypothesized that the offending youth’s race would influ-
ence the probation officers’ assessment of cause, which would in turn
influence the officers’ perception of the proper sentence and the
youth’s likelihood of recidivism.230  External influences included evi-
dence of delinquent peers, dysfunctional families, drug use, alcohol
use, and difficulties at school.231  Personality influences included lack
of remorse, lack of cooperation with the probation officer, and failure
to take the proceedings seriously.232  After controlling for the severity
of the youth’s current and past criminal behavior, researchers found
that probation officers were significantly more likely to attribute crime
to internal causes with black rather than white youth and were more
likely to view black youth as responsible for their crimes and prone to
criminal behavior in the future.233  Probation officers were also much
more likely to recommend sentences longer than the sentencing
guideline range when the officers perceived the youth to have nega-
tive personality traits and a high risk of recidivism.234  Because proba-
tion officers consistently portrayed black youth with more negative
personality traits than white youth for the same or similar behavior in
226 Id. at 500.
227 See Bridges & Steen, supra note 207, at 561–67; Aneeta Rattan et al., Race and the R
Fragility of the Legal Distinction Between Juveniles and Adults, PLOS ONE, May 2012, at 1–5.
228 Bridges & Steen, supra note 207, at 557–58. R
229 See id. at 558.
230 See id. at 559 (emphasis omitted).
231 See id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 563–64.
234 Id. at 567.
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the probation reports, black youth faced more severe penalties, in-
cluding confinement.235
More recently, in a 2012 Stanford University study on the effects
of race on the perception of juvenile culpability, psychologists found
that race had a significant effect on white Americans’ support for se-
vere sentences, such as life without the possibility of parole for youth
and perceptions of juveniles’ blameworthiness relative to adults.236
Researchers in the Stanford study provided participants with a factual
summary of the Supreme Court case Sullivan v. Florida and informa-
tion about support for and opposition to life without parole sentences
for youth in nonhomicide cases.237  To examine the impact of race on
the participants’ perceptions of youth as a mitigating factor in this
context, researchers manipulated the race of the offender from black
to white in half of the case summaries.238  Even when controlling for
the participant’s political ideology and evidence of racial bias, the re-
searchers found that study participants were more likely to impose
harsher sentences when researchers explicitly primed participants to
believe that the offender was black than when researchers primed par-
ticipants to believe that the offender was white.239  Remarkably, the
effect of race on perceptions of juvenile culpability was the same for
both liberal and conservative white Americans.240  As the researchers
at Stanford point out, the findings on implicit bias demonstrate the
“fragility of protections for juveniles when race is in play,”241 which
may significantly influence public policy regarding adolescent sen-
tencing and transfer to adult court.242
The results of these three studies should not be surprising in light
of the many studies demonstrating that black defendants—both juve-
nile and adult—receive longer and more severe punishments at sen-
tencing.243  Studies on the correlation between skin tone and criminal
punishment reveal that “dark-skinned people are more likely to be
suspected” of criminal behavior and are likely to receive more severe
235 Id.
236 Rattan et al., supra note 227, at 4. R
237 Id. at 2 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument, Sullivan v. Florida, 129 S. Ct. 2157
(2010) (No. 08-7621)).
238 Id.
239 Id. at 2, 4 (reporting the results of 735 white American study subjects who are over-
represented in jury pools, the legal field and the judiciary).
240 Id.
241 Brooke Donald, Stanford Psychologists Examine How Race Affects Juvenile Sentencing,
STAN. NEWS (May 24, 2012), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/may/race-juvenile-of-
fenders-052412.html (quoting Aneeta Rattan, lead author of the Stanford study).
242 Rattan et al., supra note 227, at 1–2, 4. R
243 Graham & Lowery, supra note 213, at 483, 494, 499; Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial R
Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 621, 629 (2005); Margaret C. Stevenson & Bette L. Bottoms, Race Shapes Per-
ceptions of Juvenile Offenders in Criminal Court, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1660, 1680 (2009).
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punishment than those meted out to whites or light-skinned blacks for
the same offense.244  When courts transfer youth to the adult system, it
is equally well documented that black youth receive significantly more
punitive sentences than white youth.245  Thus, while courts may for-
give or excuse white youth for engaging in reckless adolescent behav-
ior, courts often perceive youth of color as wild, uncontrollable, and
morally corrupt and hold them fully culpable for their conduct.246
Within the juvenile and criminal justice systems, racialized as-
sumptions and attitudes tend to reduce sympathy for those who have
been accused.247  In individual cases, negative stereotypes and assump-
tions about blacks as a group are attributed to individual defendants
in the system.248  As a result, juvenile court personnel who perceive
black youth as violent may process them differently from white
youth.249  “Although the extent to which prejudice shapes opinion
and practice is quite uncertain, the research evidence supports the
view that it plays a pernicious role.”250  Collectively, these studies
demonstrate an unwillingness among stakeholders to apply theories of
diminished culpability and immaturity to youth of color and suggest
that contemporary juvenile justice policies have been implemented
unevenly based on distorted perceptions of race, crime, and threat.251
244 Tonry, supra note 199, at 283–84 (discussing research on “colorism” and citing Ni- R
lanjana Dasgupta, Group Entitativity and Group Perception: Associations Between Features and
Psychological Judgment, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 991 (1999) and Travis L. Dixon &
Keith B. Maddox, Skin Tone, Crime News, and Social Reality Judgments: Priming the Stereotype of
the Dark and Dangerous Black Criminal, 35 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1555 (2005)).
245 Kareem L. Jordan & Tina L. Freiburger, Examining the Impact of Race and Ethnicity on
the Sentencing of Juveniles in the Adult Court, 21 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 185, 194–97 (2010); see
also infra notes 250–51 (discussing additional studies). R
246 See Espiritu, supra note 207, at 199–201 (linking the perception of violent crime as R
primarily perpetuated by youth of color and the passage of Proposition 21 in California,
which made it possible to transfer youth as young as fourteen to adult court); Nunn, supra
note 107, at 706–09; Soung, supra note 11, at 436–38; Tonry, supra note 199, at 283–85. R
247 See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 21, at 809–10 (noting that racial R
stereotypes against minorities can override paternalistic rehabilitative goals of juvenile jus-
tice systems); Tonry, supra note 199, at 293 (noting a widespread belief that “the conditions R
of life that lead some black people to crime are their own fault and they deserve whatever
punishment they get”).
248 Tonry, supra note 199, at 281–82 (describing the phenomenon of “statistical R
discrimination”).
249 BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
265 (1999); Nunn, supra note 107, at 707–08 (noting that some judges may use characteris- R
tics like race to build mental maps of defendants’ “underlying character” to predict the
defendants’ future actions).
250 Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 21, at 810; see also Bridges & Steen, R
supra note 207, at 556 (finding probation officers are more likely to perceive black youth as R
likely to reoffend than white youth); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias
Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1196–97, 1221–26 (2009) (discussing an
empirical study showing that trial judges hold implicit biases along racial lines that can
affect their judicial decision making).
251 See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 21, at 809–10. R
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Although many scholars have speculated about the role of prose-
cutors in perpetuating inequalities in the criminal justice system, few
empirical studies have engaged prosecutors as research partici-
pants.252  Nonetheless, there is little reason to believe that prosecutors
are less susceptible to the tendency of even the most well-intentioned,
egalitarian people to automatically associate blacks with crime and
make decisions accordingly.253  Implicit bias studies demonstrate that
bias against blacks and Hispanics persists even when study subjects
profess a commitment to racial equality.254  Where insidious claims
that blacks are racially inferior have been abandoned, they are often
replaced by the view that blacks are responsible for their own life con-
ditions and thus deserve whatever punishment they receive in re-
sponse to crime.255
Statistical evidence also confirms that prosecutors are more likely
to charge black suspects than whites, even when their prior criminal
records are the same.256  Likewise, while there are no national data on
the number of youth transferred to adult court on the basis of
prosecutorial waivers, evidence demonstrates that youth of color are
disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system.257  In
deciding whether to charge, what charge to bring, and whether to
transfer a youth to criminal court, prosecutors are vulnerable to racial-
ized perceptions of aggressiveness, violence, and danger that typically
undergird prosecutorial discretion.258  The Vera Institute, in coopera-
252 Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 796, 804, 822 (2012) (suggesting that
despite compelling proof of implicit bias in a range of domains, there is no direct empiri-
cal proof of implicit bias in prosecutorial decision making). But see WAYNE MCKENZIE ET
AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE: USING DATA TO ADVANCE FAIR-
NESS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 2, 6–9 (2009), available at http://www.vera.org/download?
file=3482/Using-data-to-advance-fairness-in-criminal-prosecution.pdf (describing the Pros-
ecution and Racial Justice (PRJ) program’s data collection efforts at prosecutor offices,
which include multivariable data collection at four different decision-making stages (initial
case screening, charging, plea offers, and disposition) and interpretation of the data); Ge-
off Ward et al., Racial Politics of Juvenile Justice Policy Support: Juvenile Court Worker Orientations
Toward Disproportionate Minority Confinement, 1 RACE & JUST. 154, 179 n.16 (2011) (finding
“[b]y a very wide margin, defense attorneys are most inclined to strongly agree or agree
that minority overrepresentation is a problem, followed by probation officers and judges,”
and noting that “[f]ew prosecutors express any agreement with this statement”).
253 Smith & Levinson, supra note 252, at 801, 810. R
254 Kang, supra note 209, at 1514–15. R
255 Tonry, supra note 199, at 280, 305–07 (contending that “[a]s time passed, most R
white people abandoned ideas about black racial inferiority but replaced them with racial
resentments: that disadvantaged black people have received too much support from the
state and are responsible for the adverse social and economic conditions of their lives”).
256 See Smith & Levinson, supra note 252, at 806 n.48 (citing studies). R
257 See supra notes 156–59. R
258 Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 13, 35 (1998) (noting that prosecutors may unconsciously view a case involving a
white victim as more serious than a case involving a black victim in making charging and
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tion with district attorney offices in select jurisdictions throughout the
country, recently collected data through its Prosecution and Racial
Justice Project to identify racial disparities in prosecution practices.259
Upon finding evidence of disparity in the charging decisions, the Vera
Institute worked with the local district attorney to identify and address
the source of that disparity.260  The next Part explicitly examines the
role of race in prosecutorial decision making and identifies strategies
prosecutors may employ to confront their own bias and correct racial
disparities throughout the system.
III
THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORS IN CORRECTING RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion
1. Case Examples
Although the Due Process Revolution of the 1960s constrained
the informality of juvenile courts across the country,261 it is unlikely
that discretion will—or ever should—be completely eliminated.262
State actors today still exercise vast discretion at all stages of the juve-
nile justice system.263  Police must decide whether to arrest or release
an accused youth; prosecutors must decide whether to prosecute, di-
vert, or dismiss a juvenile case; and judges must decide whether to
detain or release a youth awaiting trial or at disposition.  Implicit in
each of these decisions is a determination of whether the decision
maker will treat the youth’s conduct as “normal” adolescent behavior
that society is willing and able to tolerate or deviant behavior warrant-
ing law enforcement intervention.  The benefits and risks of discre-
tion are best understood through the lens of case examples involving
other related decisions); Smith & Levinson, supra note 252, at 811 (suggesting that when R
prosecutors decide to charge juvenile suspects in adult court as opposed to juvenile court,
they assess the seriousness of the alleged offense in relation to the offender).
259 MCKENZIE ET AL., supra note 252, at 6–7 (discussing findings of and solutions to R
disparities in Milwaukee charging decisions); see also infra notes 267–72 and accompanying R
text (discussing prosecutorial discretion and the potential for bias).
260 MCKENZIE ET AL., supra note 252, at 6–7. R
261 Bishop & Farber, supra note 20, at 132–36 (discussing the due process revolution); R
see Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 21, at 1461–83 (tracing the racial and R
political history from the first juvenile courts to the due process revolution).
262 Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 21, at 1491–93 (pointing out that R
the Supreme Court’s decision not to extend the jury right to juveniles rested partly on the
need for juvenile judges to have “flexibility”); Neitz, supra note 48, at 109–12 (discussing R
the benefits of granting judges in juvenile court discretion to both determine degree of
culpability and dispositions).
263 Moriearty, supra note 48, at 286 (“Criminal jurisprudence was eschewed in favor of R
procedural informality and nearly unfettered discretion . . . .”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-2\CRN203.txt unknown Seq: 45  2-JAN-13 14:13
2013] CRIMINALIZING NORMAL ADOLESCENT BEHAVIOR 427
youth recently charged with delinquency in an urban juvenile
court.264
Jaquan: Several boys are sitting outside in a public park.  Jaquan, aged
fifteen, finds marijuana in his older brother’s room and brings it out to share
with his friends.  All of the boys try it—each one excited about the opportu-
nity to experiment and afraid of appearing lame in front of his friends.
Police arrest all of the boys and prosecutors charge each with possession of
marijuana. Prosecutors also charge Jaquan with distribution.
James: Fifteen-year-old James is wearing a hoodie sweatshirt in public, a
violation of an obscure city ordinance prohibiting such attire.  James mouths
off at the police officer who tells him to take it off.  The police officer arrests
James.  Prosecutors charge James with resisting a police officer for refusing to
comply with the officer’s instructions.
Eric, Mark, & Derrick: Fifteen-year-old Eric sees twelve-year-old Robert
standing in line at an ice cream truck.  Eric grabs Robert’s money, throws it
in the air, and runs away laughing.  Robert runs away in the opposite direc-
tion without picking up the money.  Mark and Derrick, two other twelve-year-
olds standing in line at the ice cream truck, pick up the money from the
ground and pocket it.  Mark and Derrick are prosecuted in juvenile court for
taking property without right.  Prosecutors charge Eric with robbery.
Rodney & Roland: Two African American boys, Rodney and Roland,
throw pebbles across the train tracks at a young Hispanic boy, Jose´, for no
reason other than they are bored and Jose´ is different.  Rodney and Roland,
both aged fourteen, are charged in juvenile court with assault with a danger-
ous weapon.
Shannon: Sixteen-year-old Shannon is riding a public bus with five
classmates from her special education school when she notices one of the
teacher’s aides from her school at the back of the bus.  Shannon snatches the
aide’s hat and tosses it to one of her classmates.  After playing a game of
catch with the hat through peals of laughter, the children drop the hat and
get off the bus.  Police arrest Shannon at school the next day.  Prosecutors
charge her with robbery.
Jacob: For several weeks, two or three classmates verbally tease Jacob, a
chubby thirteen-year-old.  Jacob is visibly pained and distraught by the verbal
abuse.  About two months into the school year, a group of unknown youth
approach Jacob as he is sitting alone at a lunch table.  Unsure of their mo-
tives, but without any physical provocation to justify a claim of self-defense,
Jacob throws a book, hitting one of the youth in the face and breaking his
glasses.  Prosecutors charge Jacob with felony assault and destruction of
property.
All of these examples involve allegations that, if true, meet the
statutory elements for the crimes listed.  Yet, as with any decision in
the juvenile justice system, police and prosecutors have discretion not
to act.  Notwithstanding the obvious dangers of drug experimentation
264 Each of these examples comes from my own representation of youth in Washing-
ton, D.C.  I have changed the names to protect confidentiality.
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and the frustration caused to the teacher’s aide who lost his hat, few
would criticize a law enforcement officer who exercised discretion to
send Jaquan and his friends home with a warning and referral to a
local drug education class or a school principal who decided not to
call the police in response to Shannon’s school bus prank.  Many
would even respect and applaud the prosecutor who refused to prose-
cute a black youth who had been arrested for wearing a hoodie in
public or the prosecutor who simply encouraged Mark and Derrick to
return the money to the boy at the ice cream truck.  Likewise, many
would be pleased with the prosecutor who declined to prosecute Rod-
ney and Roland and instead made them apologize to Jose´ and partici-
pate in a victim-offender mediation session.  Others would be satisfied
if Jacob could receive counseling from the school psychologist, apolo-
gize to the student he hit, and pay for the broken glasses or partici-
pate in community service.  Equally important, teachers could use the
circumstances to educate the other youth who teased Jacob about the
effects of bullying and require them to participate in mediation.  Yet,
despite the availability of these options, cases like these routinely pop-
ulate juvenile courts across the country and at rates that dispropor-
tionately include youth of color.265  These cases also routinely send
youth of color to overnight detention, or in Jacob’s case, consign
them to long-term out-of-home placements for mental health
services.266
Excusing adolescent behavior from criminal liability is not a new
concept.  Early statutes in many jurisdictions prohibited states from
prosecuting youth under the age of seven and imposed a burden on
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that children be-
tween the ages of seven and fourteen understood the wrongfulness of
their conduct and could control their behavior.267  Several contempo-
rary commentators have called for a return to this “infancy defense”
and have explored ways in which current research in adolescent devel-
opment may provide a complete defense, excuse, or justification for
delinquency.268  Others have advocated a reasonable child standard
that would ease the evaluation of affirmative defenses for youth, such
265 See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text. R
266 See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. R
267 Kaban & Orlando, supra note 103, at 36–37. R
268 Andrew M. Carter, Age Matters: The Case for a Constitutionalized Infancy Defense, 54 U.
KAN. L. REV. 687, 734–49 (2006) (arguing that the infancy defense is deeply rooted in
tradition and constitutionally mandated because juveniles under fourteen lack the moral
culpability for criminal conduct); Kaban & Orlando, supra note 103, at 36–37 (describing R
the recent use of brain imaging for juveniles in evaluating culpability); Merril Sobie, The
Delinquent “Toddler”: The Minimum Age of Responsibility, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2012, at 36, 36,
41–42 (arguing for the establishment of a minimum age of criminal responsibility); Lara A.
Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy Is the Preadolescent’s Best Defense
in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 190–98 (2000) (suggesting revitalization of the
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as self-defense, and allow defense counsel to challenge evidence re-
garding the mens rea necessary to satisfy the requirement of criminal
intent.269  Whether by statutory authority or the reasonable exercise of
discretion implicitly granted to all decision makers in the system,
there is value in fairly and equitably accounting for the normative fea-
tures of adolescent development in deciding how to respond to
delinquency.
Of course, the problem with discretion lies in the risk of bias and
abuse.  Abuses of prosecutorial discretion in the juvenile and criminal
justice systems have been thoroughly critiqued,270 and literature on
the disproportionate representation of children of color in juvenile
courts has repeatedly condemned the broad discretion afforded to
prosecutors, judges, and probation officers as providing a safe haven
for implicit or explicit racial animus.271  Like other stakeholders in the
system, prosecutors are susceptible to the unconscious effects of nega-
tive stereotypes and harmful narratives about youth of color.  The del-
uge of police and school referrals involving African American and
Hispanic youth likely further distort prosecutorial decisions.272  Al-
though reform is certainly needed throughout the juvenile justice pro-
cess, this section focuses on the unique opportunity and responsibility
prosecutors have to confront bias and reduce racial disparities at the
charging phase.
infancy defense by adopting a presumption against the necessary mens rea for
preadolescents).
269 See, e.g., Nina W. Chernoff & Marsha L. Levick, Beyond the Death Penalty: Implications
of Adolescent Development Research for the Prosecution, Defense, and Sanctioning of Youthful Offend-
ers, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 209, 213–15 (2005); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 21, at R
165–67.
270 See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECU-
TOR 33–39 (2007); Victor L. Streib, Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile Homicide Cases, 109
PENN. ST. L. REV. 1071, 1083–84 (2005) (arguing that “jurisdictions that permit prosecutors
to file juvenile homicide cases either in juvenile court or in criminal court raise the most
serious concerns about unchecked prosecutorial discretion”).
271 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile Justice
Reforms as Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 515 (2009) (suggesting
that the absence of judicial review of prosecutors’ discretionary decisions is troubling be-
cause racial  prejudice can affect discretionary judgments made in the juvenile justice sys-
tem, as seen in Louisiana); Davis, supra note 258, at 35 (explaining the danger of R
unconscious racial biases in prosecutors); Neitz, supra note 48, at 131–32 (discussing how R
wide discretion on the part of juvenile justice judges may allow room for racially biased
decision making); Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena’s D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 416–21 (2009) (stating that “[t]ruly  unconscious  racial
prejudice,  even  by  whites  thoroughly and  consciously  committed  to  racial  equality,  is
likely  even  more widespread”).
272 See Taslitz, supra note 271, at 417–20 (recognizing that biased decision making and R
the overrepresentation of minorities in each stage of the criminal process before prosecu-
tion likely contribute to prosecutorial bias).
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2. The Prosecutor as Gatekeeper of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
As the statistics in Part I reveal, racial disparities surface in the
juvenile justice system long before the charging decision.  Police ar-
rest youth of color at rates that far exceed their proportion in soci-
ety,273 and zero tolerance policies in many public schools contribute
to the disproportionate referral of youth of color to juvenile courts.274
Once police or school officials refer a youth to the judicial system,
prosecutors who evaluate the strength and merits of the delinquency
allegation and probation officers who review information about the
youth’s family, neighborhood, school, and academic performance
share responsibility for the case.275 Probation officers may also advise
prosecutors whether to file or decline to file a formal complaint.276
Despite the significant role that probation officers, police, and schools
play in contributing to racial disparities in the juvenile justice system,
prosecutors are arguably the system’s most powerful decision mak-
ers.277  As the gatekeepers of juvenile court jurisdiction, prosecutors
wield enormous power to decline prosecution, divert youth from the
system, and identify creative alternatives to adjudication.
Unlike school officials and police officers who generally interact
with youth in a limited geographic space, prosecutors typically screen
referrals from across the city and may track and compare patterns of
arrests and referrals by neighborhood.278  Prosecutors who recognize
that youth of color are routinely referred from one or more schools
for drug use, disorderly conduct, or other low- to midlevel offenses
may decline to prosecute and encourage schools and community lead-
ers to identify responses to adolescent offending that do not impose
the stigma and collateral consequences of a juvenile court adjudica-
tion.279  By declining to prosecute categories of adolescent behavior,
prosecutors set the standard for juvenile court intake and over time
may significantly influence patterns of arrest and referral.  To avoid
claims that prosecutors and police officers ignore or underenforce
criminal laws in communities of color,280 prosecutors must communi-
cate the rationale for their charging decisions and actively engage the
273 See supra notes 145–57 and accompanying text. R
274 See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text. R
275 See Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic
Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 304–05 (2003).
276 See id.
277 See Davis, supra note 258, at 17–18. R
278 See, e.g., MCKENZIE ET AL., supra note 252, at 1–7 (explaining how charging data was R
tracked across Charlotte, Milwaukee, and San Diego).
279 See Davis, supra note 258, at 37. R
280 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 19 (1997); Alexandra Natapoff,
Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1716–18 (2006); see also Tracey L. Meares &
Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v Morales,
1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 199–200 (discussing the passage and enforcement of gang
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community, legislators, and school leaders in developing alternatives
to prosecution.281
B. Addressing Implicit Bias and Derationalizing Race-Based
Disparities
Scholars and advocates have advanced several models for reduc-
ing racial bias in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  Proposals
include limiting prosecutorial discretion through statutory amend-
ments, imposing greater oversight on prosecutorial discretion by
courts, requiring prosecutors to collect and publish data in racial im-
pact studies that track the race or ethnicity of the defendant and vic-
tim in each case, designating staff to mask the demographic
information on case files before prosecutors make charging decisions,
providing financial incentives to reduce charging in cases where the
government’s evidence is weak or unsubstantiated, and even funda-
mentally changing the nature and role of the prosecutor.282  This Arti-
cle builds upon these strategies by recognizing the unique
intersection of racial bias and adolescent development at the charging
phase of adjudication and by encouraging prosecutors to develop a
decision-making framework that directly confronts bias, is informed
by research in adolescent development, and allows the public to hold
prosecutors accountable for racial disparities in charging practices
over time.  Specifically, this section returns to the research on implicit
bias in search of strategies to overcome unconscious preconceptions
and invites prosecutors to stop rationalizing racially disparate out-
comes and think more creatively about how to satisfy the competing
interests of public safety and victims’ rights without perpetuating ste-
reotypes and disparities.
loitering legislation in response to “voluminous citizen complaints about” violence and
“open-air drug dealing”).
281 See infra Part III.B, D.
282 See Beale, supra note 271, at 515 (noting the lack of judicial review of prosecutorial R
discretion); Davis, supra note 258, at 54–56 (advocating for data collection and racial im- R
pact studies); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion
and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 873–89 (1995) (proposing
that financial  incentives be applied  to  various  duties  of the  public  prosecutor); Smith &
Levinson, supra note 252, at 823–26 (proposing a range of solutions including the masking R
of demographic data on prosecution files); Streib, supra note 270, at 1084–85 (advocating R
for a statutory minimum age for transfer to adult court in juvenile homicides); Taslitz,
supra note 271, at 442–49 (advocating for moving away from the adversarial model of pros- R
ecution toward a new collaborative approach deemed the “Medical Model”); Prosecutorial
Discretion, VERA INST. JUST., http://www.vera.org/project/prosecution-and-racial-justice
(last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
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1. Filtering Out Explicit and Implicit Bias
Any effort to reduce racial disparities in the juvenile or criminal
justice system must start with a commitment to address implicit bias.
Some studies have suggested that well-intentioned actors can over-
come automatic or implicit biases, at least to some limited extent,
when they are made aware of the stereotypes and biases they hold,
have the cognitive capacity to self-correct, and are motivated to do
so.283  While some evidence supports the suggestion that more delib-
erative decision making may weaken implicit biases,284 some scholars
have argued that attempts to suppress stereotypes may actually exacer-
bate biases by causing people to think about them more.285  To
counter this possibility, one group of researchers has suggested that
bias affirmation may be offset by being “motivat[ed] to control stere-
otyping, [having] experience or practice with stereotype control, hav-
ing egalitarian replacement thoughts,” collecting and relying on
information that individualizes the suspect, and committing to avoid
prejudice in decision making.286  Prosecutors may be especially moti-
vated by a desire to avoid a reputation of racism, a genuine dedication
to principles of equity, and a commitment to ensure accurate out-
comes in adjudication.287
Other research suggests that implicit bias can be improved when
actors are repeatedly exposed to positive images of people within an
identified racial group.288 Studies indicate that implicit bias may be
significantly improved when the actors develop a relationship with a
member of a previously stereotyped or devalued group.289  For exam-
ple, a parent whose child marries a person from another race may be
better equipped to reexamine stereotypes.  In the justice system con-
text, prosecutors interested in overcoming stereotypes may engage
283 See, e.g., John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious Influences on Judicial Decision-
Making: The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2010) (summarizing re-
search on strategies to reduce implicit judicial bias); Kang, supra note 209, at 1529–30 & R
n.207 (citing Patricia G. Devine & Margo J. Monteith, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyp-
ing, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 339, 346–47 (Shelly Chaiken &
Yaacov Trope eds., 1999)); Rachlinski et al., supra note 250, at 1221 (indicating that judges R
are able to control implicit biases when they are aware of them and motivated to do so).
284 Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Founda-
tions, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 962–65 (2006).
285 See Margo J. Monteith et al., Suppression as a Stereotype Control Strategy, 2 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PYSCHOL. REV. 63, 64 (1998); B. Keith Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on
Accessibility Bias and Cognitive Control in Race-Based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J. EXPERIMEN-
TAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 390–95 (2002).
286 Monteith et al., supra note 285, at 73. R
287 Kang, supra note 209, at 1530. R
288 Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Atti-
tudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 802, 806–07 (2001).
289 See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 284, at 964. R
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more closely with communities of color by attending neighborhood
meetings, volunteering at neighbor recreation centers, or serving on a
collaborative task force with community representatives to develop
creative alternatives to prosecution.
Training and periodic reviews of prosecutorial decisions should
accompany any effort to combat bias.290  Training curricula would ex-
pose prosecutors to implicit bias research and educate prosecutors on
the normative similarities in adolescent development across socioeco-
nomic and ethnic groups.291  The leadership in the state’s attorney’s
office may set office-wide goals to reduce racial disparities and invite
new and experienced prosecutors to brainstorm about strategies to
combat disparities that occur at arrest and referral.  Collectively, pros-
ecutors may identify and agree to reexamine common stereotypes and
presumptions that are made about youth of color, not only by them-
selves, but also by the system’s other decision makers.  Experienced
prosecutors may identify their own biases by taking the Implicit Associ-
ation Test (IAT) and reviewing their own race-correlated charging de-
cisions over the previous year.292
2. Derationalizing Race-Based Outcomes
If asked, most prosecutors would say they are not racist and would
be offended by the suggestion.  Most would also be able to provide a
rational, race-neutral explanation to support each of the charging de-
cisions they made by pointing to the dangerousness of the crime, the
youth’s record of prior offending, the child’s lack of family support,
the victim’s rights, public safety, and the need to respond to commu-
nity and constituent interests.  Even prosecutors who have been intro-
duced to adolescent development research may rationalize
differential treatment of serious juvenile offenders with claims—albeit
unfounded—that serious offenders must fall outside of the normative
developmental trajectory.293  Unfortunately, this type of rationaliza-
tion of racial disparities prevents even well-intentioned prosecutors
from meaningfully addressing the core concern of disproportionate
minority contact within the juvenile justice system.  Prosecutors can-
not absolve themselves of responsibility for racial disparities by over-
290 See Irwin & Real, supra note 283, at 9 (suggesting that postdecision auditing and R
exposure to positive role models might mitigate judges’ implicit biases); Smith & Levinson,
supra note 252, at 824. R
291 See supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing developmental research con- R
trolling for ethnicity and socioeconomic status).
292 See generally Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit
Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 852–60 (2012) (discussing the controversial proposal that
jurors, judges, and attorneys take the IAT).
293 See supra notes 65–90 and accompanying text (discussing normative adolescent de- R
velopment); see also Brief for APA, Miller, supra note 73, at 33 (positing that the vast major- R
ity of serious juvenile offenders desist from crime when they mature).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-2\CRN203.txt unknown Seq: 52  2-JAN-13 14:13
434 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:383
looking structural factors that produce different types of adolescent
offending, by pandering to explicit or implicit racist constituent inter-
ests, or by refusing to confront the impact of implicit bias on their
own interpretation of factors such as the perception of dangerousness
and a youth’s ties to the community.
Prosecutors occupy a unique position in the justice system and
are often called upon to satisfy many competing interests.  Victims in
individual cases expect prosecutors to recoup restitution, secure an
apology from the offender, and even make sure the victims have their
own day in court.294  Communities expect prosecutors to hold youth
accountable for harm to their property and physical safety, and legisla-
tors expect prosecutors to be fiscally responsible in choosing between
rehabilitative and law enforcement options.  Local frontline attorneys
are also often beholden to elected district attorneys who dole out pro-
motions, bonuses, raises, and even continued employment according
to convictions, pleas, and adjudications.295  In this landscape, race be-
comes irrelevant and disparities seem intractable.
Prosecutors committed to reducing racial disparities will need to
think creatively about how to satisfy competing interests without per-
petuating racially disparate outcomes.  To address public safety con-
cerns, prosecutors must be familiar with evidence-based, best practices
for successful interventions with serious juvenile offenders.296  Those
strategies will often involve community-based responses instead of
traditional law enforcement interventions such as incarceration.  To
address the victims’ needs, prosecutors may consider research sug-
gesting that many victims are receptive to meaningful alternatives to
adjudication and formal court involvement.297  Empirical studies com-
paring victim satisfaction in restorative justice programs with victim
satisfaction in court found that participants in victim-offender media-
tion were more satisfied with the way their cases were handled than
294 See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen
Years After the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 21, 48–58 (1999) (discussing the right of victims to be present at the crimi-
nal justice proceedings).
295 See Catherine M. Coles, Community Prosecution, Problem Solving, and Public Accounta-
bility: The Evolving Strategy of the American Prosecutor 11 (Program in Criminal Justice Policy &
Mgmt. of the Malcolm Wiener Ctr. for Soc. Policy, Working Paper No. 00-02-04, 2000),
available at http://130.203.133.150/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=D35E277C93209F69FA3
353DA3EC5F238?doi=10.1.1.91.2361&rep=rep1&type=pbf (discussing the “considerable
discretion” of the district attorney to retain prosecutors based on the number of trials,
percentage of convictions and pleas, and the length of sentences attained).
296 See infra notes 381–85, 424–30 and accompanying text (discussing evidence-based R
strategies to facilitate positive youth development and a successful transition from adoles-
cence to an adulthood free of crime).
297 See Henning, Eroding Confidentiality, supra note 26, at 1163–66 (discussing the bene-
fits for victims of participating in adjudicative alternatives).
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victims who only participated in court.298  Victims who participated in
mediation and other restorative justice programs were also more likely
than victims who appeared in court to believe that the mediator had
been fair and that the offenders had been held accountable.299  These
victims were equally likely to believe that their opinions had been ade-
quately considered in the criminal justice process and were less likely
to feel afraid or upset about the crime than those who only met the
offenders in court.300
In response to constituent concerns about high and rising juve-
nile crime, prosecutors will need to correct faulty perceptions about
the nature and scope of youth crime in the community.  Despite the
focus on high-profile crime in the media, most juvenile offending in-
volves misdemeanors and low- and midlevel felonies.  In 2010, approx-
imately 71% of youth detained or committed by the juvenile justice
system were charged with simple assault, drug offenses, property
crimes, violations of a public order, technical violations, or “status of-
fenses.”301  Just 27% of detained or committed youth had committed
homicide, violent sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated assault.302
Further, as the case examples above reveal, even felony labels such as
the charge of robbery imposed on Shannon, who snatched a hat from
the teacher’s aide, may mask typical adolescent behavior that can
likely be redirected without court involvement.
Ultimately, although prosecutors may temporarily sacrifice repu-
tation among constituents who are upset by the prosecutor’s failure to
charge and pursue a juvenile offense, prosecutors can restore reputa-
tion by educating the community on the key features of adolescent
offending and resilience and by being transparent about policies and
practices that intend to address racial disparities in the system.  Scien-
tific validation and Supreme Court endorsement of the developmen-
tal research give much-needed credibility to adolescent-appropriate
responses to delinquency and shield prosecutors accused of being soft
on crime.303  Even when constituents and victims remain committed
298 See Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the Psychological
Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 180 (collecting and analyzing studies);
see also Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Crimi-
nal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 132 (2004) (discussing studies that confirm that offenders
are more likely to apologize after meaningful face-to-face interaction with their victim).
299 Poulson, supra note 298, at 185, 187. R
300 Id. at 185, 193, 195–96.
301 Puzzanchera et al., supra note 104. R
302 Id.
303 See Maroney, supra note 69, at 104–06 (detailing how Justice John Paul Stevens’s R
dissent from the denial of petition for writ of habeas corpus in In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968
(2002), which endorsed scientific arguments regarding adolescent development, drew “a
groundswell of attention to the teen brain from advocates, commentators, and the media,”
leading to the later involvement of developmental research in juvenile criminal cases).
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to retribution and incarceration for young offenders, prosecutors will
have to make hard choices that disappoint some but nonetheless ap-
ply principles of diminished culpability more equitably to youth of
color and achieve public safety through strategies that promote reha-
bilitation and positive youth development.
C. Refining Prosecutorial Discretion: Identifying a Framework
for Developmentally Informed Decision Making
To meaningfully and equitably extend the principles of dimin-
ished culpability to all youth at the intake phase of the juvenile case,
prosecutors need a practical framework for applying the developmen-
tal research to the charging decision.  Because the fields of develop-
mental psychology and neurology are normative—and thus only seek
to identify general trends in the development of youth as a class—it is
difficult to translate the research into individual case decisions.304
The research cannot tell us why any particular youth committed an
offense or whether that youth will engage in criminal behavior in the
future.305  Consequently, the developmental literature cannot provide
infallible and precise guidelines for how to respond to every child in
every circumstance. Nonetheless, decision-making guidelines and
trainings that highlight the features of adolescent development
should help prosecutors contextualize the behavior of youth of color
within identified developmental norms and reduce prosecutors’ over-
reliance on juvenile courts to regulate normal adolescent offending in
communities of color.  By requiring prosecutors to explicitly consider
features of normative adolescent development in every case, they will
begin to unpack and discard deeply embedded perceptions of youth
of color as callous, mature, and irredeemable.
This section envisions a path toward structured decision making
at the charging phase that capitalizes on the differences between
juveniles and adults and targets racial inequalities by challenging dis-
torted notions of race and maturity.  The ultimate goal is to identify
charging criteria that produce fair, equitable, and effective outcomes
for all youth.  Fair decisions account for developmental research sup-
porting the diminished culpability of youth; equitable decisions apply
the relevant research to all alleged offenders; and effective responses
improve public safety by promoting positive youth development.  To
304 See Thomas Grisso, Adolescents’ Decision Making: A Developmental Perspective on Consti-
tutional Provisions in Delinquency Cases, 32 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3,
13–14 (2006) (discussing the difficulties of evaluating the capacities of youths on a case-by-
case basis).
305 See Brief for APA, Miller, supra note 73, at 21–25; see also David O. Brink, Immaturity, R
Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer: How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82
TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1584 (2004) (noting that, despite a strong correlation between age and
maturity, there will always be individual variance).
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ensure community buy-in and expert guidance, I propose that local
jurisdictions convene a committee of prosecutors, probation officers,
experts in developmental psychology, school officials, and other com-
munity stakeholders to develop and publish charging standards that
reflect these goals.  Recognizing that discretion is an important com-
ponent of juvenile justice and that committees should develop and
modify charging criteria over time to meet the specific needs of the
community, this section does not propose a rigid set of rules.  Instead,
this section offers a broad framework guided by adolescent psychology
research that will be useful across jurisdictions.
1. Charging Standards and Commentary
In most states, prosecutors make charging decisions with little
guidance about whether and how to charge youth.  Even when stat-
utes and court rules express a preference for diversion or the least
restrictive response to adolescent offending, these statutory provisions
are often vague and rarely provide specific guidelines for charging
youth in juvenile court.306  Moreover, prosecutors have published few
internal standards to guide prosecutorial decisions at the juvenile in-
take and charging stage.307  The guidelines that do exist do not ade-
quately account for contemporary developmental research and
provide little or no guidance for prosecutors who seek to address ra-
cial disparities.
The criteria that the National District Attorney’s Association’s
(NDAA) identified in the National Prosecution Standards provide a
foundation for analyzing how prosecutors can incorporate develop-
mental research into charging standards and commentary.308  Current
306 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.010 (2010) (including diversion from the formal ad-
judication process as a goal of the system); D.C. CODE § 16-2301.02(2) (LexisNexis 2001)
(including “promot[ing] youth development . . . through early intervention, diversion, and
community-based alternatives” as a goal); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388.24(2)(1) (West Supp.
2012) (outlining goals of Minnesota’s pretrial diversion “to provide eligible offenders with
an alternative to adjudication that emphasizes restorative justice”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 43-260.04 (LexisNexis 2011) (outlining factors to consider before diversion including the
juvenile’s age and nature of offense, but no overt reference to developmental considera-
tions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A–71 (West Supp. 2012) (outlining factors to consider before
diversion including, broadly, a juvenile’s “age and maturity”); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 938.01(2)(e) (West Supp. 2011) (including in the legislative intent the goal of diverting
juveniles “as warranted”).
307 See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1543 (1981) (discussing prosecutors’ reluctance to limit their discretion and impose inter-
nal guidelines). But see INST. FOR JUDICIAL ADMIN.–ABA JOINT COMM’N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROSECUTION §§ 4.1–4.4, at 17–18 (1979) (discussing
standards for the “[p]readjudication [p]hase” that impose certain duties on juvenile prose-
cutors);  NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-11, at 64–67 (3d
ed. 2010) (outlining various factors a prosecutor should consider when making decisions
regarding juveniles, such as whether to transfer them to adult court).
308 NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note 307, at 64–67. R
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NDAA standards recommend that prosecutors in juvenile cases con-
sider the “seriousness of the alleged offense”; the alleged role of the
accused youth in the offense; the “nature and number of previous
cases” against the youth and their disposition; the youth’s “age, matur-
ity, and mental status”; the availability of appropriate treatment or ser-
vices through the juvenile court or diversion; the youth’s admission of
guilt or acceptance of responsibility for involvement in the charged
offense; the “dangerousness or threat posed by the juvenile to the per-
son or property of others”; “decision[s] made with respect to similarly-
situated juveniles”; the “provision of financial restitution to victims”;
and “[r]ecommendations of the referring agency, victim, law enforce-
ment and advocates for the juvenile.”309
Notwithstanding the explicit reference to age and maturity, these
standards differ little from adult charging guidelines.310  Many of the
criteria lack detail and specificity, and none adequately account for
the youth’s diminished culpability and amenability to treatment.
Written standards such as these should incorporate commentary that
illuminates the meaning and relevance of specific charging criteria.
The commentary should explain key features of adolescent offending
and incorporate research on adolescents’ amenability to treatment as
an important reminder that retributive responses are not always neces-
sary or warranted when responding to delinquency.  Moreover, the
commentary should explain terms and concepts such as age, maturity,
and mental status with sufficient nuance to distinguish between cogni-
tive capacity and psychosocial deficiencies that persist long after youth
develop the capacity to reason.  A closer examination of some of the
charging criteria proposed by the NDAA is instructive.
Alleged role in offense.  Research in normative developmental psy-
chology would provide important background for prosecutors evaluat-
ing a youth’s alleged role in the offense.  As examined in Part I,
normative features of adolescence include the prevalence of risk tak-
ing among all youth, the limits of adolescent cognitive and
psychosocial capacity in the heat of a crime, the impact of impulsivity
and peer influence on adolescent judgments, and the tendency of ad-
olescents to underestimate the risk of harm in a given situation.
These insights would help prosecutors understand the spontaneous
and unplanned roles youth often play in delinquency cases.311  More
importantly, the commentary should encourage prosecutors to con-
sider the role of group dynamics in adolescent offending and help
309 Id. at 65.
310 Cf. id. at 52–53 (outlining factors to consider in filing charges against an adult). See
generally Rory K. Little, The ABA’s Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecu-
tion and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1112–20 (2011) (discussing the develop-
ment of standards to guide prosecutorial decision making).
311 See supra notes 65–90 and accompanying text. R
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prosecutors understand the difficulties an adolescent may face when
attempting to exit from an escalating criminal event.  While these nor-
mative features cannot account for every incidence of delinquency,
this contextual backdrop will help put seemingly callous behavior in
perspective and, over time, decrease the chances that prosecutors au-
tomatically view youth of color as cruel, calculating, or indifferent to
the harms caused to others.
Ideally, prosecutors and probation officers who understand defi-
ciencies in adolescents’ psychosocial development will be better
equipped to respond to youth like Jaquan and his friends, who experi-
mented with drugs in the case example above.  Prosecutors who un-
derstand that teenagers are particularly susceptible to peer influence,
frequently underestimate the risks that drug use poses, and often fo-
cus heavily on immediate gratification while ignoring the long-term
consequences of their actions may be more willing to divert Jaquan
from the juvenile justice system to a community-based drug-awareness
program.  Similarly, a prosecutor who understands that many adoles-
cents like Jacob lack impulse control, have a heightened perception of
threat, and have difficulty regulating their emotions, may credit Ja-
cob’s claim of self-defense and send Jacob back to his school for coun-
seling and mediation.312
Seriousness of the current offense and nature and number of prior of-
fenses.  Standards should encourage prosecutors to be especially mind-
ful about labeling offenses when youth are involved.  Prosecutors
should consider the nature and number of current and previous juve-
nile offenses in terms that avoid the often meaningless classifications
of misdemeanor and felony.  As evident in each of the case examples
above, the decision of whether and how to charge an offense is a
highly subjective endeavor that assigns labels that often mask the true
nature and circumstances of the underlying offense.  Thus, a youth
who has a record of two “violent felonies” (e.g., robbery and assault
with a dangerous weapon) may have engaged in little more than play-
ing catch with a teacher’s hat or throwing pebbles at a classmate.  By
requiring prosecutors to look more closely at charges through the lens
of adolescent development, standards may help prosecutors measure
perceptions of danger and the seriousness of the offense against the
normative behavior of a typical adolescent who is likely to mature out
of his delinquent behavior with correction from teachers and
relatives.
312 See Jeffrey Fagan, Contexts of Choice by Adolescents in Criminal Events, in YOUTH ON
TRIAL, supra note 65, at 371, 390–91 (arguing that the claim of self-defense should be used R
more liberally as a claim of “contextual influence” in juvenile cases, considering juveniles’
social environment in determining culpability for violent encounters); see also Taylor-
Thompson, supra note 21, at 165–67 (discussing an adolescent’s ability to assert “develop- R
mental negligence”).
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Youth’s admission of guilt and acceptance of responsibility.  The
NDAA’s reference to the youth’s admission of guilt and acceptance of
responsibility for the charged offense provides the prosecutor with lit-
tle guidance and is subject to multiple interpretations.  For some, the
criterion may imply that youth are entitled to a lesser punishment for
confessing early and taking responsibility.313  For others, the criterion
may suggest that an offender’s confession provides firm evidence to
justify formal prosecution.  Commentary by developmental psycholo-
gists would illuminate this criterion in two ways.  First, developmental
research would help prosecutors understand the difficulties that
youth often face in expressing remorse in the hours and days after an
offense.314  Youth who have limited life experiences and diminished
capacity to reason may not experience or understand remorse like an
adult.315  Similarly, youth who lack strong language skills may struggle
to convey remorse to a police officer, victim, or probation officer
shortly after an offense.316  Other developmental features of adoles-
cence, such as peer influence and teenage bravado, may further block
adultlike expressions of grief and remorse.317  Moreover, because re-
morse itself is a form of suffering, youth sometimes employ defense
mechanisms such as humor, denial, or apparent indifference to avoid
it.318  Given these limitations, empathy and remorse provide a particu-
larly unreliable measure of a youth’s amenability to treatment and
need for punishment, especially in police interrogation and intake in-
313 See Bridges & Steen, supra note 207, at 567 n.2 (noting in their empirical study of R
probation officers that the most influential factor on risk assessments was negative internal
attributes including lack of cooperation and remorse); Graham & Halliday, supra note 206, R
at 359 (noting that adolescents often lack the ability to manage the impression they are
making on others or understand how that impression may negatively impact their naviga-
tion through the juvenile justice system); Henning, Victims’ Rights, supra note 56, at 1148 R
(discussing the expectation of adolescent remorse in the juvenile justice system).
314 See Martha Grace Duncan, “So Young and So Untender”: Remorseless Children and the
Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1491 (2002) (arguing that the practice of
looking for sorrow in the first few hours after the crime inaccurately assumes that remorse
is an “automatic reaction, not something that may be achieved over time”); Henning, Vic-
tims’ Rights, supra note 56, at 1148–53 (discussing the unreliability of empathy and remorse R
as a measure of a youth’s amenability to treatment).
315 Henning, Victims’ Rights, supra note 56, at 1149. R
316 See Bryan H. Ward, Sentencing Without Remorse, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 131, 142–44
(2006); see also People v. Superior Court ex rel. Soon Ja Du, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 181 (Ct.
App. 1992) (discussing the trial court’s grant of a probationary sentence after defendant
was convicted of voluntary manslaughter because the defendant’s failure to show remorse
likely resulted from cultural and language barriers); cf. Joseph A. Nese, Jr., Comment, The
Fate of Mentally Retarded Criminals: An Examination of the Propriety of Their Execution Under the
Eighth Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 373, 383 (2002) (discussing how “mentally retarded”
criminal defendants’ courtroom demeanor may give a false impression of lack of remorse).
317 See Duncan, supra note 314, at 1504–07 (discussing how youth culture often re- R
quires youth to hide their weaknesses, project a violent image, and stifle guilt and other
remorseful emotions).
318 Id. at 1472, 1478–79, 1485, 1500.
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terviews that occur before the youth has had an opportunity to reflect
or benefit from counseling.319
Second, developmental research should educate prosecutors on
the particular susceptibility of youth to false confessions and prompt
prosecutors to closely investigate and critically evaluate the circum-
stances surrounding a minor’s admission.320  Indeed, youth is a signifi-
cant risk factor for police-induced false confessions.321  The very
features of adolescence that make youth vulnerable to peer influence
and poor decision making also make youth susceptible to police coer-
cion.  Many traits of adolescence, such as a limited appreciation for
the future, impulsiveness, and inadequate legal knowledge, explain
why youth falsely confess to police.322  Moreover, contemporary police
interrogation strategies, such as physical custody, isolation from sup-
portive adults, the presentation of false or nonexistent evidence to
convey guilt, and minimization of the severity of the crime or the sus-
pect’s culpability, all take advantage of adolescents’ particular vulnera-
bilities and increase the likelihood of a false confession.323  Whatever
meaning prosecutors assign to this criterion must account for these
developmental findings and avoid prosecutions based solely on a
youth’s purported confession or failure to show remorse.
Dangerousness of the threat posed to others.  The implicit bias studies
discussed in Part II show that charging criteria involving the perceived
threat and dangerousness of an accused youth are particularly suscep-
tible to racial bias.  Criteria that emphasize “dangerousness” may also
increase the prosecutor’s tendency to rely on traditional law enforce-
ment responses to adolescent offending and detract from evidence-
based, positive youth responses that are more likely to improve public
safety by facilitating the youth’s successful maturation.  Instead, these
criteria should force prosecutors to consider the youth’s ability to re-
integrate into society with appropriate interventions and encourage
319 Id. at 1473–75.
320 See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401 (2011) (recognizing the tenuous
nature of juvenile confessions in overwhelming situations such as in the presence of a
police officer); Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051,
1112 (2010) (proposing that courts appoint experts to evaluate individuals who are sug-
gestible to false confessions); Allison D. Redlich, The Susceptibility of Juveniles to False Confes-
sions and False Guilty Pleas, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 943, 953 (2010) (examining whether the
tendency of adolescents to give false confessions translates into a higher rate of guilty pleas
for juveniles than adults).
321 Redlich, supra note 320, at 953. R
322 Id.
323 Id. at 952–53; see also Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confes-
sions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 907–18 (2004) (describing modern police
interrogation tactics that at times “lead the innocent to confess falsely”); Saul M. Kassin et
al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3,
6–7, 19 (2010) (discussing how police interrogation presupposes guilt and employs tactics
to extract confessions).
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prosecutors to identify and rely on community-based responses that
have been shown to correct the behavior of even serious, violent of-
fenders.324  In addition, to remind prosecutors that risk taking is nor-
matively common among all adolescent groups, even if opportunities
for crime are different, standards and commentary should incorpo-
rate research on the impact of implicit bias on perceptions of danger
and aggressiveness and highlight developmental studies that have con-
trolled for ethnicity and socioeconomic status.  Review of this litera-
ture will remind prosecutors, for example, that children of color who
use crack cocaine are essentially no different than other youth who
experiment with drugs.
Decisions made with respect to similarly situated persons.  The implicit
admonition to treat similarly situated persons the same is particularly
inadequate to address racial disparities in the juvenile justice system.
Such admonition begs the question of what the relevant, distinguish-
ing criteria should be.  As is evident in our discussion of offense label-
ing, charging practices that draw artificial lines between felonies and
misdemeanors provide little more than a superficial way to identify
similarly situated persons.  Office-wide policies that prevent a prosecu-
tor from diverting a felony ignore the fact that prosecutors choose the
felony label.  In addition, policies that prevent frontline attorneys
from diverting drug cases involving “more dangerous” drugs such as
crack, crystal meth, or heroin may systemically disadvantage youth of
color who live in communities where those drugs are less expensive
and more accessible.
To better understand the impact of office-wide policies on com-
munities of color, the state’s attorney and a committee of stakeholders
may identify patterns in how prosecutors handle various offenses at
the charging phase according to race and neighborhood.  The Vera
Institute’s Prosecution and Racial Justice Project employed a similar
tracking system in Milwaukee in 2009 and revealed that Milwaukee
prosecutors declined to prosecute 41% of white adults charged with
possession of drug paraphernalia compared to only 27% of nonwhite
adults arrested for the same offense.325  The project revealed that Afri-
can American defendants commonly possessed crack pipes, whereas
white defendants possessed more varied types of paraphernalia.326
The study further revealed that prosecutors pursued the drug para-
phernalia charges more aggressively if the paraphernalia was a crack
pipe.327  Following this revelation, the Milwaukee district attorney
adopted a policy that directs staff to decline all paraphernalia cases
324 See infra text accompanying notes 381–85, 425–30. R
325 MCKENZIE ET AL., supra note 252, at 6–7. R
326 Id.
327 Id.
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“whenever it [is] reasonable to do so and to refer the arrested individ-
uals to drug treatment.”328  As the Vera Institute discovered, while
prosecutors treated all crack cocaine paraphernalia charges similarly,
there was a categorical disparity between the response to crack co-
caine paraphernalia and other drug paraphernalia.329
In the juvenile justice context, prosecutors distinguish between
alleged offenders not only on the basis of the alleged offense, but also
on the basis of what Professor Perry Moriearty refers to as “attribu-
tional stereotypes.”330 Attributional stereotypes, such as perceived
family stability, community support, and school performance, are
closely correlated with race and contribute to the disproportionate in-
carceration of children of color.331  For example, probation officers
and prosecutors may decline to divert youth from the system when the
youth’s parents appear uncooperative and are unavailable for the in-
take interview.332  State actors may also presume that parents who
work long or nontraditional hours are unable to provide adequate su-
pervision at home.333  Youth of color, whose parents are more likely to
have low-wage jobs with strict leave policies, bear the brunt of these
factors.334
As a result, prosecutors should routinely evaluate and revise pros-
ecution standards to correct for evidence of racially disparate out-
comes.  Prosecutors may engage community stakeholders for a
periodic review of the charging criteria to monitor and adjust for such
unintended consequences.  For instance, when a parent is unable to
attend the intake interview, the probation officer should have the dis-
cretion to conduct a phone interview, identify other relatives or adults
who may supervise the child, or refer the youth to an after-school pro-
gram in lieu of the automatic default to formal prosecution.
Recommendations of the referring agency, victim, law enforcement, and
advocates for the youth.  Although victims and witnesses who report an
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Moriearty, supra note 48, at 304. R
331 See id. at 287, 299–308; see also Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 374, 412 (2007) (discussing how facially neutral, yet racially loaded, factors such as
“family structure” were replaced by “whether there is an adult willing to be responsible for
assuring the youth’s appearance in court” after the disproportionate minority contact
(DMC) standard required states to consider how an agency’s decisions may contribute to
racial disparity) (quoting ELEANOR H. HOYTT ET AL., REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN JUVE-
NILE DETENTION 57 (2004), available at http://www.aecf.org/upload/publicationfiles/
reducing%20racial%20disparities.pdf); Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Fami-
lies: The Collateral Damage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005, 1020–27 (2001)
(discussing the disparate treatment of black juvenile delinquents in a number of
jurisdictions).
332 Johnson, supra note 331, at 405. R
333 Id.
334 See id.
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offense and police officers who investigate a case will necessarily influ-
ence prosecutorial discretion, prosecutors must exercise independent
judgment at the charging phase.  Indeed, rote implementation of the
police recommendation merely perpetuates racial disparities that sur-
face before the charging decision.  Similarly, even when victims’ rights
provisions require that victims have a voice in the charging decision,
prosecutors should be careful not to return the criminal justice system
to its past as a system of private redress that sanctions and reinforces
implicit biases and stereotypes that private citizens hold.335  Conse-
quently, standards should encourage prosecutors to educate victims
on meaningful alternatives to prosecution for youth and be transpar-
ent about the underlying reasons for each charging decision.
Prosecutors have an opportunity to systemically influence private
and public agencies (e.g., schools), which repeatedly and dispropor-
tionately refer youth of color to the juvenile justice system.  Following
the lead of Judge Steven Teske and others who have developed proto-
cols to reverse the trend toward escalating school referrals, prosecu-
tors may routinely decline to prosecute school referrals that involve
disorderly conduct, trespass, simple drug possession, disregard of po-
lice commands, school fights that do not involve serious or ongoing
injuries, and petty thefts when the victim receives restitution or the
benefit of community service.336  Disturbed by the increasing reliance
on law enforcement and juvenile courts to manage adolescent behav-
ior on school campuses, Judge Teske led a stakeholder team in 2003
in Clayton County, Georgia to develop a School Offense Protocol to
reduce the number of referrals for low-level misdemeanor offenses
that accounted for the majority of school referrals to the courts.337
Pursuant to the protocol, SROs must impose a series of graduated
sanctions and educational programming within the school before they
can refer a student to court for the specified offenses.338  The proto-
cols recognize that state intervention through formal complaints, po-
335 See Henning, Victims’ Rights, supra note 56, at 1110, 1143. R
336 COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE JUVENILE COURT OF CLAYTON COUNTY, THE
CLAYTON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM, THE CLAYTON COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE
RIVERDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE FOREST PARK PO-
LICE DEPARTMENT, THE CLAYTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES,
THE CLAYTON CENTER FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES, ROBERT E. KELLER, DISTRICT AT-
TORNEY AND THE GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 2–4 (2004) [hereinafter COOP-
ERATIVE AGREEMENT], available at publichealth.lsuhsc.edu/iphj/pdf/SOLibrary1.pdf (agreeing
that minor acts of misbehavior by juvenile delinquents do not justify court intervention or
supervision); see also Sherrod et al., supra note 158 (noting that incarceration increases the R
likelihood that a juvenile will not graduate from high school, which reduces enrollment
and decreases federal funding to the school); St. George, supra note 162 (highlighting R
Judge Teske’s efforts to reform the juvenile justice system).
337 St. George, supra note 162. R
338 Students may receive a warning for a first offense and may be referred to a school
conflict diversion program or mediation for a second or subsequent offense.  A student
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lice involvement, and adjudication of delinquency is not always
necessary to redirect youth and prevent recidivism.339  As discovered
in Georgia, school social workers and counselors are often in a better
position than courts to prevent and correct misconduct among
youth.340
School Offense Protocols have had some success in reducing dis-
proportionate minority contact with the juvenile court.  With the pro-
tocols in place, Clayton County school referrals declined by 45%
between 2004 and 2005 and by more than 70% between 2004 and
2010.341  Referrals of African American youth to court were reduced
by 46%.342  Other communities have followed Clayton County’s lead.
Judge Brian Huff from Birmingham, Alabama, replicated the Clayton
County protocols in 2009 and reduced referrals for school-based con-
duct from 528 in the 2007–2008 academic year to 174 in 2010–2011
academic year.343  In Denver, advocates convinced the Denver Public
School system to revise school discipline practices to require school
officials to handle minor acts of misconduct within the school setting
and limit suspensions, expulsions, and police referrals to serious mis-
conduct.344  These efforts have reduced school-based referrals by
63%.345  Similarly, San Francisco schools adopted policies restricting
police intervention in schools to situations where such responses were
required to “protect the physical safety of students and staff” or were
“required by law.”346  System-wide efforts like these to resist the steady
influx of delinquency referrals from schools would allow states to con-
serve limited resources by identifying youth whom school officials may
treat outside of the juvenile court and by encouraging policymakers
and community leaders to find more effective and less expensive pub-
lic safety measures.347
may only be referred to the juvenile court for a third or subsequent minor delinquent
offense. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT, supra note 336, at 11–13. R
339 Cf. Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Developmental Due Process: Waging a Constitutional Cam-
paign to Align School Discipline with Developmental Knowledge, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 929, 946,
965–70 (2009) (observing that school discipline policies including zero tolerance run
counter to what we know about adolescent development and can be altogether harmful,
and outlining recommended alternative disciplinary approaches).
340 See St. George, supra note 162 (quoting Luvenia Jackson, former Clayton County R
School District Assistant Superintendent).
341 Sherrod et al., supra note 158. R
342 Results from the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., http:/
/www.aecf.org/MajorInitiatives/JuvenileDetentionAlternativesInitiative/JDAIResults.aspx
(last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
343 St. George, supra note 162. R
344 ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 160, at 35. R
345 Id.
346 Id. at 37.
347 See Davis, supra note 258, at 53 (suggesting that prosecutors should consider the R
“attitudes, values and priorities of the . . . community” to determine which cases to prose-
cute given limited resources).
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2. Changing Cultures and Holding Prosecutors Accountable
A significant shortcoming of charging standards like those
drafted by the NDAA is the standards’ potential lack of enforceability
and limited transparency to the public.348  The lack of public account-
ability for prosecutors, minimal enforcement of internal decision-
making guidelines in prosecutors’ offices, and Supreme Court juris-
prudence shielding prosecutors from public and judicial scrutiny have
hindered many of the current strategies that address disproportionate
minority contact.349  Even more than judges, prosecutors operate in
virtual secrecy with unreviewable charging authority, especially in juve-
nile courts where court records and proceedings are confidential.350  I
propose to guard against these concerns in three ways: first, by identi-
fying incentives that encourage voluntary compliance with the stan-
dards; second, by recommending legislative reforms that would
require prosecutors to comply with standards; and third, by providing
an opportunity for community representatives to participate in both
the drafting of the standards and periodic review of charging
decisions.
Internal guidelines like those I discuss here generally require buy-
in from the leadership and a commitment from the entire district at-
torney’s staff to comply with the standards.  To achieve and sustain
reforms, prosecutors’ offices must change the culture that rationalizes
racially disparate outcomes and firmly resolve to resist external pres-
sures to react symbolically to high profile crimes and faulty percep-
tions of high and rising juvenile offending.  The willingness of
prosecutors in Milwaukee, San Diego, and Charlotte to submit their
charging decisions to scrutiny by the Vera Institute’s Prosecution and
Racial Justice Project suggests that some prosecutors are inclined to
examine their own practices and adopt policies to reduce dispropor-
tionate minority contact in the system.351  Given the unique role of
prosecutors in the juvenile justice system, I am even more optimistic
348 See NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note 307, at 1 (pointing out that standards do R
not create causes of action and are not to be used by disciplinary agencies). See generally
Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The Role of the Prosecutor, 39
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202, 206–10 (2007) (recognizing that even with standards in
place, unconscious racism may still play into decision making and discussing the lack of
legal remedies to counteract disparities in the system caused by implicit bias).
349 See Davis, supra note 258, at 20–21 (discussing the lack of public accountability, the R
absence or minimal enforcement of internal policies, and the Supreme Court jurispru-
dence protecting prosecutors from public and judicial scrutiny).
350 See Beale, supra note 271, at 521, 530–31 (citing statutes that allow prosecutors un- R
reviewable discretion to transfer to adult court); Davis, supra note 258, at 16–17 (arguing R
that prosecutorial discretion plays a “profound” role in racial inequality in the criminal
justice system); Streib, supra note 270, at 1083–84 (arguing that prosecutorial discretion R
should be reviewable due to its enormous consequences).
351 MCKENZIE ET AL., supra note 252, at 6–8. R
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about the willingness of juvenile prosecutors to learn and apply key
features of adolescent development to a range of prosecutorial deci-
sions.  Even when prosecutors must consider other state interests,
such as public safety and victims’ rights, the needs and the best inter-
ests of the accused child must remain an important consideration
throughout the juvenile case.352
Standards should require prosecutors to document individual
charging decisions and criteria considered, tally their decisions by
race and neighborhood, and periodically share that data with the pub-
lic.353  Over time, prosecutors may track decisions by race and resi-
dence of the offender and adjust when recurrent justifications for
charging decisions disproportionately affect youth of color.  A state’s
attorney’s office could easily identify prosecutors whose individual
charging decisions routinely disproportionately include youth of color
and require these prosecutors to explain their decisions.  Each state’s
attorney’s office should develop a uniform checklist of developmen-
tally informed criteria for charging and require prosecutors to articu-
late specific, non-race-related reasons for dismissals, diversions, and
formal prosecution in every case.  With this framework in place, a
state’s attorney who decides to prosecute Shannon for robbery for
snatching and tossing the aide’s hat should be required to articulate
how Shannon is any different, developmentally or otherwise, from a
white youth in a low-crime school who snatches a classmate’s lunch
bag and hides it in the bathroom as a practical joke.  Even a prosecu-
tor who is legitimately concerned about bullying by children should
be forced to consider whether schools or the community can provide
any developmentally appropriate rehabilitative responses to Rodney
and Roland, who threw rocks at Jose´.
When prosecutors are unwilling to develop or enforce standards
on their own initiative, state legislators may provide the impetus.  Stat-
utory mandates may require prosecutors to convene a multidiscipli-
nary stakeholder task force to develop and publish guidelines like
those described here.  Like prosecutors, legislators have a significant
role to play in addressing racial disparities in the juvenile and criminal
justice systems.  Examples of existing legislative reforms promoting ra-
352 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16–2301.02 (LexisNexis 2001) (asserting the purpose of the
juvenile justice system includes “plac[ing] a premium on the rehabilitation of children”);
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 301.1 (McKinney 2008) (stating that in every juvenile proceeding, the
court should consider the “needs and best interests of the respondent”); NAT’L DIST.
ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note 307, at 66 (noting that juvenile prosecutors should “give special R
attention” to the interests and needs of the juvenile offender, provided that the interests
are consistent with community safety and welfare).
353 See Davis, supra note 258, at 18–19 (proposing racial impact studies); Smith & Lev- R
inson, supra note 252, at 824–25 (proposing the same and suggesting other potential R
remedies).
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cial justice include the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Pre-
vention Act’s (JJDPA) Disproportionate Minority Contact Standard,
which requires state actors to determine how their decisions contrib-
ute to disparities even when agency policies and practices are reasona-
ble and not responsible for the disparity;354 the North Carolina Racial
Justice Act, which allows a defendant to appeal a death sentence when
evidence demonstrates that race weighed heavily in the prosecutor’s
or jurors’ death penalty decisions at the time the death sentence was
sought or imposed on the defendant;355 and state statutes in Iowa356
and Connecticut,357 which require racial impact statements to pro-
spectively evaluate how proposed criminal justice legislation will likely
affect racial minorities.358
Whether voluntary or legislatively mandated, standards should be
developed and periodically reviewed with input from community rep-
resentatives and adolescent development experts.  By engaging the
public, prosecutors may cultivate support from those most affected by
racial disparities, set crime control priorities that reflect the needs of
the local community, and ultimately make the juvenile charging deci-
sion more transparent.  To further ward against implicit bias and im-
prove the quality of office-wide decision making, some scholars have
recommended that prosecutors’ offices hire and promote a more di-
verse pool of attorneys from the communities most affected by these
decisions.359
Prosecution standards developed with input from the community
would not only enhance the credibility of prosecutors and the justice
system as a whole within communities of color, but would also provide
the state’s attorney with a strategy to address claims of racial bias and
354 See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2006) (requiring state plans to “reduce . . . the dispro-
portionate number of juvenile members of minority groups, who come into contact with
the juvenile justice system”). See generally Johnson, supra note 331, at 407–16 (providing an R
historical overview of the JJDPA’s DMC standard).
355 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2010 (2011); see also § 15A-2011(a)–(b) (describing how a
defendant may establish that “race was a significant factor in decisions to seek or impose
the sentence of death”).
356 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 2.56(1) (West Supp. 2012) (requiring “correctional impact
statement[s]” to asses the impact of sentencing, parole, or probation reforms on
minorities).
357 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2–24b (West Supp. 2012) (“[A] racial and ethnic im-
pact statement shall be prepared with respect to certain bills and amendments that could,
if passed, increase or decrease the pretrial or sentenced population of the correctional
facilities in this state.”).
358 See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of
Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 530–33 (2010) (surveying how Canada and numer-
ous U.S. jurisdictions have taken measures to address racial inequities in criminal justice
systems).
359 Smith & Levinson, supra note 252, at 825–26 (noting research in the jury context R
shows that diverse group decision making is better than homogenous group decision
making).
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overenforcement of criminal laws in these communities.  Collabora-
tion among community leaders and adolescent development experts
would provide an opportunity for training that educates all stakehold-
ers—not just prosecutors—on the benefits of adolescent-appropriate
responses to delinquency.360  Community leaders who are frustrated
with juvenile crime, but willing to participate in the collective effort to
reduce racial disparities in the juvenile justice system, may better un-
derstand the causes of adolescent offending and be better equipped
to identify and develop community-based and school-based responses
that meet the needs of neighborhood youth.
D. The Prosecutor’s Choice: Choosing and Planning for Positive
Youth Development
Although we know that most youth age out of delinquent behav-
ior after adolescence, the successful transition to adulthood is not au-
tomatic.361  The transition to a healthy, safe, and productive
adulthood depends on a number of variables, including the youth’s
environmental context and social supports.362  For at-risk youth, deci-
sions within the justice system play a significant role in facilitating or
undermining a youth’s successful development.  A decision to charge,
dismiss, or divert a youth from the system will often determine where
the youth will live, what services he will receive, and with whom he will
interact on a daily basis in or outside of the court system.363
Good prosecutorial decision making requires more than a nomi-
nal commitment to rehabilitation.  It requires a true understanding of
what interventions are effective and a willingness to sacrifice tempo-
rary political and reputational gains achieved from rapid law-and-or-
der responses to adolescent offending in favor of alternative strategies
360 Some states have started training for prosecutors. See, e.g., ACT 4 JUVENILE JUSTICE,
VERMONT: STATE PROFILE OF FEDERAL JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION FUND-
ING 1–3 (2012), available at http://act4jj.org/media/factsheets/factsheet_66.pdf (noting
that Vermont uses Title II funds to train prosecutors in adolescent brain development);
Jonathan Lippman, Rethinking Juvenile Justice, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 23, 2012, http://www.newyork
lawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202539352935 (referring to effort by New York to
hold trainings for prosecutors on adolescent development); Juvenile Forensic Evaluations:
Competency to Stand Trial and Treatment Amenability, CHILD. L. CENTER U.N.M., http://child
law.unm.edu/programs-past.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2012) (discussing “training for Chil-
dren’s Court judges, prosecutors and public defenders with Dr. Thomas Grisso, a nation-
ally recognized expert in adolescent development and the juvenile justice system”); PCCD
Awards Recovery Grants to Assist Counties, Prosecutors Within Juvenile Justice System, ALIPESNEWS
(Sept. 9, 2009, 11:45 AM), https://www.alipesnews.com/App.aspx#id=3058263000000000
&languageId=4000 (discussing an award of $75,000 in federal funds to the Pennsylvania
District Attorneys Institute to provide training for juvenile prosecutors, including child and
adolescent development training).
361 SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 54–56. R
362 See Chung et al., supra note 84, at 69, 73–85. R
363 See id. at 92 (discussing decision making generally throughout the juvenile justice
system).
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that have been proven to yield positive outcomes for youth and ulti-
mately the community at large.  Efforts to address disproportionate
minority contact may also call for an expansion of the role of the pros-
ecutor.  Specifically, where community-based resources are not availa-
ble to provide alternatives to formal prosecution, prosecutors may
assume a leadership role in encouraging legislators and community
representatives to develop those options.364
1. Achieving Positive Youth Development: Knowing What Works
Research shows that youth need to develop a range of cognitive
and psychosocial capacities to become healthy and productive
adults.365  Youth need educational and vocational training that will
provide them with the skills, knowledge, and “mastery and compe-
tence” to participate in society’s production and culture.366  They
need interpersonal skills and social functioning to cooperate and col-
laborate with others, maintain healthy and satisfying intimate relation-
ships, and behave responsibly toward the community in which they
live.367  And they need “self-definition and self-governance” that will
equip them with a positive sense of their own worth, independence,
and the ability to set and achieve their own goals.368  The social con-
text in which adolescents transition to adulthood has a significant im-
pact on the development of necessary cognitive and psychosocial
capacities.  Youth who have the benefit of caring, committed, and sup-
portive parents or guardians who provide them with authoritative gui-
dance and actively advocate for them in school and work are more
likely to experience healthy psychosocial development.369  Healthy
psychosocial development is also facilitated by positive peer supports
that can compensate for deficient family relationships; positive school
environments that expose youth to positive role models, prosocial
peers, and extracurricular activities; vocational skills-training that al-
low youth to achieve financial independence; and structured extracur-
ricular activities, neighborhood youth groups, and community
364 See NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note 307, at 54, 68 (encouraging prosecutors to R
take a leadership role in assuring availability of dispositional alternatives for youth who
have been adjudicated, and urging the establishment, maintenance, and enhancement of
diversion programs deemed insufficient by the chief prosecutor); see also James C. Back-
strom & Gary L. Walker, The Role of the Prosecutor in Juvenile Justice: Advocacy in the Courtroom
and Leadership in the Community, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 963, 982–87 (2006) (discussing
strategies for preventing juvenile crime and advocating for a broader role for prosecutors
in such efforts); Coles, supra note 295, at 1–2 (describing several prosecutors’ innovative R
approaches to preventing juvenile crime or implementing alternative intervention
strategies).
365 Chung et al., supra note 84, at 76. R
366 Id.
367 Id.
368 Id.
369 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 56–57; Chung et al., supra note 84, at 77. R
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programs that help youth understand civic commitment and provide
them with opportunities to think critically and independently and
make decisions that have real-world consequences.370
Even those youth who engage in delinquency in adolescence
often experience a “turning point[ ]” toward responsible law-abiding
behavior in late adolescence and early adulthood.371  Research sug-
gests that the development of a positive, supportive relationship, such
as with a girlfriend, boyfriend, or a concerned adult in the neighbor-
hood, is the most important factor in helping youth reach this turning
point.372  Educational resources, employment opportunities, the birth
of a child, and emotional support such as encouragement are other
factors that positively affect the successful transition from delinquency
to law-abiding maturity.373  Young offenders may also benefit from
mentoring by neighbors and employers who help them develop
healthy goals and values, encourage them to participate in positive
activities like school or work, and help them develop the skills they
need to assume adult roles and responsibilities.374
Youth entering the delinquency system often face multiple disad-
vantages at home and in the community and are more likely than
their nondelinquent peers to experience poor school performance,
mental health problems, unstable and unsupportive family connec-
tions, poverty, crime-ridden neighborhoods, negative peer influences,
and few positive role models.375  The significant levels of unmet
mental health needs among youth in the juvenile justice system are
well documented, as are the high rates of academic and intellectual
deficits among this population.376  Left unaddressed, these conditions
are likely to impede the transition to adulthood.377  Fortunately, as
documented in the developmental research, youth, whose identities
and characters are in rapid transition, have an inherent potential for
growth, change, and rehabilitation and will likely benefit from positive
corrections in their family, school, or community.378  Youth can often
370 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 57–58; Chung et al., supra note 84, at R
77–78.
371 Chung et al., supra note 84, at 74. R
372 Id.
373 Id. (summarizing studies).
374 Id. at 83.
375 Id. at 71.
376 THOMAS GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL DISOR-
DERS 6–13 (2004) (discussing study results); Regina M. Foley, Academic Characteristics of In-
carcerated Youth and Correctional Education Programs: A Literature Review, 9 J. EMOTIONAL &
BEHAV. DISORDERS 248, 249, 257 (2001); Linda A. Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Youth
in Juvenile Detention, 59 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1133, 1133–38 (2002).
377 See Chung et al., supra note 84, at 71. R
378 See supra notes 86–90; cf. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (“But R
none of what [Graham] said about children—about their distinctive (and transitory)
mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.”); Graham v. Florida,
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-2\CRN203.txt unknown Seq: 70  2-JAN-13 14:13
452 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:383
achieve these corrections through a range of community-based re-
sponses that are less harmful, less expensive, and more effective than
traditional law enforcement and juvenile court interventions.379
Studies have shown that even serious, violent, and chronic of-
fenders can benefit from community-based interventions.380  A num-
ber of cost-effective, community-based responses to adolescent
offending have been shown to reduce crime across a range of offend-
ing patterns.381  Among them are Functional Family Therapy (FFT),
Multisystemic Therapy (MST), and Multidimensional Treatment Fos-
ter Care (MTFC).382  FFT seeks to strengthen the family by providing
therapists who work to improve the emotional connection between
youth and their parents and to teach authoritative parenting that im-
poses structure and limits on children.383  MST, which has been par-
ticularly successful with violent and aggressive youth, is a community-
based program grounded in developmental research that seeks to em-
power families with the skills and resources they need to cope with
family problems, address peer group concerns, and advocate on be-
half of their children in the school and community.384  MTFC, which
has been particularly effective with high-risk and chronic offenders,
separates youth from their delinquent peers, provides them with adult
mentoring, heightened supervision, and support in school and the
community, and places youth with trained foster parents for six to
twelve months while they complete family therapy with their own fam-
ily.385  The success of these programs arises in part out of their atten-
tion to the psychosocial capacities youth need to prepare for
adulthood.386  Although these strategies have been employed most
often within the context of formal court involvement, there is no rea-
son they cannot be implemented with motivated youth and families in
130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (“No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court’s
observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570
(2005) (“The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”).
379 See, e.g., supra note 364 (discussing the benefits of alternative interventions and R
means of preventing juvenile crime); see also Chung et al., supra note 84, at 84 (“[T]he R
juvenile justice system as it is currently designed is neither equipped nor philosophically
driven to effectively address such psychological vulnerabilities among incarcerated youth .
 .  .  .” (citation omitted)); Laurence Steinberg et al., Reentry of Young Offenders from the
Justice System: A Developmental Perspective, 2 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 21, 29–30 (2004)
[hereinafter Steinberg et al., Reentry] (summarizing relevant literature on the obstacles to
the rehabilitation of already incarcerated youths).
380 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 217–20. R
381 Id.  For a discussion of the cost-effectiveness of the various programs, see id. at
219–20.
382 Id. at 217–19.
383 Id.
384 Id.
385 Id.
386 Id. at 216–17.
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diversion programs and administered by well-resourced public or pri-
vate agencies disentangled from the court system.
2. Knowing What Does Not Work
Just as developmentally appropriate responses to delinquency can
increase the chances that adolescents will reach a healthy turning
point in their transition to adulthood, developmentally inappropriate
interventions by the juvenile justice system can derail or impede that
transition.  Unfortunately, Justice Abe Fortas’s 1966 claim that youth
often experience the worst of both worlds in juvenile courts (i.e., that
juvenile courts provide neither the full range of procedural protec-
tions available to adults nor the rehabilitation promised to youth) may
be truer than ever.387  As discussed above, adolescents are referred to
juvenile court more often and for less serious crimes, are more likely
to be detained than ever before, and face a host of collateral conse-
quences that impede their development.388
As Professors Jeffrey Fagan and Tracey Meares have argued,
harsh punishments like incarceration appear to have an iatrogenic—
or counterdeterrent—effect on crime, especially among persons of
color who live in poor neighborhoods.389  In what they describe as a
“paradox of punishment,”390 Fagan and Meares contend that public
policy choices that shift resources to traditional law enforcement strat-
egies and away from employment opportunities, education, and
neighborhood supports undermine informal social controls that pro-
vide a natural deterrent to crime and produce stable, if not higher,
levels of crime.391  These findings are especially relevant for youth
who need role models, educational and vocational training, and com-
munity supports to foster a successful transition to adulthood.  High
rates of punishment in communities of color also reduce the stigma
traditionally associated with a finding of delinquency and undermine
the value of incarceration as a deterrent to crime and delinquency.392
Individual and community dissatisfaction with procedural and distrib-
utive justice can foster cynicism and noncompliance and can further
undermine the deterrent effect of juvenile and criminal justice
interventions.393
Pretrial detention, incarceration, and secure treatment during
adolescence are particularly detrimental to healthy psychosocial devel-
387 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
388 See supra notes 60–64, 150–52 and accompanying text. R
389 Fagan & Meares, supra note 202, at 173. R
390 Id. at 176.
391 Id. at 173, 183–202.
392 Id. at 173–74, 228.
393 Id. at 173–74, 216–19 (discussing Tom Tyler’s work on procedural justice and per-
ceptions of police legitimacy).
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opment.394  Incarceration disrupts important opportunities for proper
socialization,395 may fracture or further deteriorate youths’ already
troubled relationships with their parents, and may cause youth to lose
the support of adults when they need it most.396  Youth who are sepa-
rated from family and friends during incarceration withdraw from
school, lose any employment they had in the neighborhood, and have
little opportunity to develop positive peer relationships while away
from home.397  Not surprisingly, incarcerated youth are more likely to
increase antisocial behavior after exposure to and placement with
other delinquent youth.398  Further, any stigma and rejection associ-
ated with the court involvement will likely have a significant psycho-
logical impact on the self-image and identity of incarcerated youth
who are removed from their communities.399  As at least one study has
shown, youth who are labeled delinquents may develop fears about
their future and themselves that exceed their hopes and expecta-
tions.400  Given this reality, youth returning to the community after
incarceration are particularly unprepared with the psychosocial capac-
ities they need to succeed as adults.401
Youth placed in facilities euphemistically named “residential
treatment centers” fare little better than youth in more traditional cor-
rectional facilities.  There is little to no reliable research to support
the presumption that residential treatment centers improve behav-
ioral problems.402  In fact, placing youth with behavioral difficulties
with other children with similar issues may exacerbate the youth’s
394 See Steinberg et al., Reentry, supra note 379, at 27–28. R
395 See Chung et al., supra note 84, at 79. R
396 See id. at 101(summarizing studies); Kristin Henning, It Takes a Lawyer to Raise a
Child?: Allocating Responsibilities Among Parents, Children, and Lawyers in Delinquency Cases, 6
NEV. L.J. 836, 862 (2006).
397 See Chung et al., supra note 84, at 81–82. R
398 Id.
399 Id. at 82 (discussing studies).
400 Steinberg et al., Reentry, supra note 379, at 29. R
401 Chung et al., supra note 84, at 80 (noting that even when correctional facilities have R
educational and vocational training, the programs are not designed to train youth to be
more psychosocially mature).
402 See, e.g., MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS., PERSPECTIVES ON RESIDENTIAL AND COMMUNITY-
BASED TREATMENT FOR YOUTH AND FAMILIES 4 (2010), available at http://www.magellan
health.com/media/2718/CommunityResidentailTreatment_White_Paper.pdf (noting the
lack of research to prove effectiveness of residential treatments); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 118 (2001) (discuss-
ing evaluations of residential programs that show little promise of reducing subsequent
crime and violence in delinquent youths); UNIV. LEGAL SERVS., INC., OUT OF STATE, OUT OF
MIND: THE HIDDEN LIVES OF D.C. YOUTH IN RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT CENTERS 10 (2009),
available at http://www.uls-dc.org/out-2520of-2520state-2520out-2520of-2520mind-2520
revision-2520final.pdf (stating residential treatment centers are not evidence-based prac-
tices because there is “weak evidence” for the effectiveness of residential treatments).
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problems.403  Not only do residential treatment centers deprive youth
of positive role models, but they may also cause youth to adopt their
peers’ negative behaviors.404  Residential treatment programs can also
be physically dangerous, as youth may be at risk of abuse from other
residents or from staff who rely on aggressive behavioral control meth-
ods such as seclusion and restraints.405  In 2007, the Government Ac-
countability Office released a report surveying residential treatment
programs throughout the country and documenting rampant allega-
tions of abuse and reports of deaths.406  Such abuse is particularly
harmful to youths’ psyche and ability to function upon their return to
the community.407  Furthermore, any skills acquired or other gains
made while in “treatment” are often lost in the difficult transition
from institutionalization back to the community.408  As a result, many
children revert to old behavioral patterns upon release.409  One 2002
study showed that only about 30% of young adults attended school or
were employed twelve months after their release from a residential or
correctional facility.410
In many states, the mere decision to charge a youth and the
choice of which offense to charge them with affects the likelihood of
detention and incarceration, removal from school, loss of public hous-
ing, transfer to adult court, and public stigma resulting from the elim-
ination of confidentiality protections for many juvenile offenses.411
Thus, a child like Rodney or Roland, charged with assault with a dan-
gerous weapon for throwing pebbles, or Shannon, charged with rob-
403 BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF GROUP
PLACEMENTS/SERVICES FOR YOUTH WITH BEHAVIORAL HEALTH PROBLEMS 2 (2006), available
at http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=NCd6-AmZxdg%3d&tabid=166 (pos-
iting that segregating youth with behavioral issues is more harmful than helpful).
404 Id.; UNIV. LEGAL SERVS., INC., supra note 402, at 7. R
405 UNIV. LEGAL SERVS., INC., supra note 402, at 7–10; see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY R
OFFICE, GAO-08-146T, RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS: CONCERNS REGARDING ABUSE
AND DEATH IN CERTAIN PROGRAMS FOR TROUBLED YOUTH 12–34 (2007) (detailing case stud-
ies of death and abuse of youth in residential treatment centers).
406 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 405. R
407 See MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS., supra note 402, at 4–5 (stating “milieu in residential R
treatment may have serious adverse effects on many adolescents” who learn inappropriate
behavior and do not maintain any improvements made between admission and discharge);
UNIV. LEGAL SERVS., INC., supra note 402, at 7 (discussing the isolating and abusive nature R
of residential treatment centers, which impedes clinical treatment and quality of life, in-
cluding social contacts, economic independence, and work options).
408 MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS., supra note 402, at 4–5. R
409 Id.
410 See Michael Bullis et al., Life on the “Outs”—Examination of the Facility-to-Community
Transition of Incarcerated Youth, 69 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 7, 7 (2002).
411 See Beale, supra note 271, at 521 (discussing state laws that increasingly focus on the R
offense with a goal of punishment and expand the types of offenses and offenders eligible
for transfer from juvenile courts to adult criminal court); see also Henning, Eroding Confi-
dentiality, supra note 26, at 542–60 (outlining the effects of eliminating confidentiality pro- R
tections for juvenile offenses, particularly in terms of school exclusion and stigma).
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bery for snatching her aide’s hat, would automatically be ineligible for
diversion and possibly subject to eviction from public housing or ex-
clusion from public schools for engaging in purportedly dangerous
felony conduct.  Many schools prevent youth from reenrolling after
detention because of concerns about the youth’s behavior, academic
performance, and impact on the school’s overall academic rating.412
Even if a school permits youths to return, academic credits the youth
earned in placement often will not transfer to their home schools.413
Youth incarcerated in juvenile facilities may also be automatically re-
moved from Medicaid rolls and required to reenroll through a
lengthy reapplication process upon release.414  Other youth may be-
come homeless because of laws that make them and their families in-
eligible to live in Section 8 housing after adjudication.415  Formerly
incarcerated adolescents also have difficulty finding employment and
reaching educational goals like attaining a high school diploma or
GED.416  Even when formerly incarcerated youth do secure employ-
ment, their earnings are likely to be less than those who have not been
incarcerated.417  Youth adjudicated delinquent by a court are also
more likely to depend on welfare and face problems with mental
health, substance abuse, divorce, or parenting unexpected
children.418
3. Empowering Communities: Identifying and Developing Effective
Adolescent-Appropriate Alternatives to Formal Prosecution
Efforts to reduce racial disparities in juvenile court are not likely
to succeed without adequate community-based, adolescent-appropri-
ate alternatives to prosecution.  A prosecutor who believes that infor-
mal interventions will not meet a victim’s needs or that adequate
resources are not available in the community to respond to delin-
quency will be more likely to prosecute.419 The disproportionate
prosecution of offenses committed by black and Hispanic youth may
reflect a belief that communities of color are either disempowered or
412 ASHLEY NELLIS & RICHARD HOOKS WAYMAN, YOUTH REENTRY TASK FORCE OF THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION COALITION, BACK ON TRACK: SUPPORTING
YOUTH REENTRY FROM OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT TO THE COMMUNITY 17–18 (2009) (outlin-
ing the negative effects of out-of-home placement).
413 Id.
414 Id. at 19–21.
415 Id. at 21–22.
416 See Chung et al., supra note 84, at 72 (summarizing studies that suggest a low per- R
centage of adolescent offenders find employment or receive high school diplomas or
GEDs as adults).
417 Id.
418 Id. at 73.
419 NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note 307, at 65 (including “[t]he existence of the R
appropriate treatment or services available through the juvenile court or through diver-
sion” as a factor in the charging decision).
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unwilling to control and regulate adolescent offending in their own
neighborhoods.  These explicit or latent perceptions echo those of
the founders of the first juvenile courts and reflect more recent claims
that poor African American families and communities are not taking
responsibility for the welfare, education, and safety of their own chil-
dren.420  Unfortunately, these assumptions ignore the long history of
self-help in black communities.421  Marginal realignment of financial
resources in communities of color from traditional law enforcement
interventions to efforts designed to improve failing schools, dilapi-
dated housing, mental health services, family counseling, and drug
treatment would better equip these communities to address adoles-
cent offending without court intervention.
Prosecutors willing to assume a more expansive leadership role in
addressing racial disparities should collaborate with probation of-
ficers, community leaders, and other juvenile justice stakeholders.
Combined, this team should compile a database of existing resources
in the community, including faith-based resources, community recrea-
tion centers, school-based services, and family support groups that
may provide an alternative to prosecution and respond to low- and
midlevel offending by youth in communities of color.422  The team
should review this database for gaps in services and analyze it to iden-
tify opportunities to combine existing resources for wider impact.  Evi-
dence of creative examples across the country demonstrate that
community groups are available to facilitate victim-offender media-
tion, engage youth in drug awareness, provide community service op-
portunities, and provide mentoring for youth.423  Prosecutors should
provide a list of relevant services to school officials when a prosecutor
declines to charge school-based offenses.
Where resources are lacking or inadequate, prosecutors, policy-
makers, and other state officials arguably have a responsibility to en-
sure that youth of color have sufficient access to alternatives to
prosecution that facilitate healthy, normative development and create
420 See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text; see also Richard Leiby, Cosby, Saying R
the Darndest Things, WASH. POST, May 19, 2004, at C3 (discussing Bill Cosby’s public con-
demnation of African American families).
421 WARD, supra note 12, at 127–263 (documenting the long history of black communi- R
ties attempting to provide resources for delinquent youth).
422 See infra notes 424–28 and accompanying text (discussing the Annie E. Casey Foun- R
dation’s Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative).
423 See, e.g., About Omega Boys Club, STREET SOLDIERS: OMEGA BOYS CLUB, http://www.
street-soldiers.org/programs.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2012) (community-based program
helping young men with conflict resolution); About Us, LATIN AM. YOUTH CLUB, http://
www.layc-dc.org/index.php/about-us-intro.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2012) (community-
based holistic case management to aid at-risk youth); Who We Are, CROWN HEIGHTS COMMU-
NITY MEDIATION CENTER, http://www.crownheightsmediationcenter.org/p/who-we-are.
html (last visited Nov. 6, 2012) (community-based center helping youth navigate their envi-
ronment in Brooklyn, New York).
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positive opportunities in communities of color.  Communities would
benefit from creative partnerships with police, substance abuse prov-
iders, state and local mental health agencies, and schools.  As a poten-
tial model for reform, communities may look to the Casey
Foundation, which has documented considerable success in reducing
the disproportionate confinement of youth of color through its Juve-
nile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI).424  The Casey Founda-
tion’s allocation of resources to develop alternatives to detention,
where none existed, contributed significantly to the success of its JDAI
efforts.  With the assistance of JDAI, Santa Cruz reduced its average
minority population in juvenile detention from 64% to 47% after
opening a neighborhood evening center for high-risk Hispanic
youth.425  Multnomah County, Oregon also reduced the proportion of
minorities in detention from 73% before JDAI to 50% after JDAI.426
Prosecutors may follow the lead of the New Orleans District Attorney
Office, which is participating in the American Bar Association’s Racial
Improvement Project and working to expand and improve its diver-
sion program to make it more accessible to Hispanics.427
Diversion programs that direct youth out of the system are an
important component of any strategy to reduce the disproportionate
contact of youth of color with the juvenile justice system.  Programs
like teen courts hold youth accountable for their misconduct through
restitution or community service, but seek to disentangle those reha-
bilitative and corrective responses from the juvenile adjudication and
its collateral consequences.428  The success of many youth in diversion
suggests that nonlegal interventions are often just as effective as law
enforcement responses to delinquency.429  Further, evidence suggests
424 Results from the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, supra note 342. R
425 Id.
426 Id.
427 The Racial Justice Improvement Project, A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC., http://racialjustice
project.weebly.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).  In select jurisdictions, the ABA Racial Jus-
tice Improvement Project creates task forces, including district attorneys, in cooperation
with courts, public defenders, police departments, and nonprofit organizations, to address
discrete racial justice goals at different points in the criminal justice process. Id. Task
forces have been established in the state of Delaware; St. Louis County, Minnesota; Kings
County, New York; and New Orleans, Louisiana. Id.
428 Edgar Cahn & Cynthia Robbins, An Offer They Can’t Refuse: Racial Disparity in Juvenile
Justice and Deliberate Indifference Meet Alternatives that Work, 13 UDC L. REV. 71, 97–98 (2010)
(discussing the success of the Time Dollar Youth Court program, which allows police to
divert youth to teen courts rather than to the traditional adjudication format in juvenile
cases); Segadelli, supra note 64, at 714–19 (discussing youth court programs and their fu- R
ture role).
429 See Joseph J. Cocozza et al., Diversion from the Juvenile Justice System: The Miami-Dade
Juvenile Assessment Center Post-Arrest Diversion Program, 40 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 935,
937–39 (2005) (discussing the success and characteristics of nonlegal interventions such as
Functional Family Therapy and Multisystemic Therapy).
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that community-based programs like teen courts save money and re-
duce crime over time.430
A brief word of caution is warranted about court-sponsored and
court-monitored diversion.  Diversion takes many forms, with some
programs providing considerably more state intervention and intru-
sion into the child’s life than others.  A youth may be diverted from
the juvenile court at any stage of the process, including the precharge,
predisposition, or postdisposition phases.  True diversion typically
takes place before arrest and before referral to the juvenile court.431
Other diversion efforts—such as dismissing a formal petition after the
youth has completed a term of probation—merely reduce the extent
to which youth penetrate through the system.432  Still other diversion
efforts refer youth to agencies and programs outside of the justice
system.433
Some advocates and scholars have complained that diversion
merely widens the net of youth under state control without due pro-
cess.434  Although diversion is typically voluntary, youth rarely have ac-
cess to counsel when they agree to participate and diversion requires
them to waive their right to trial and admit guilt to the alleged offense
before they are eligible for the programs.435  Youth who violate the
conditions of diversion may be referred back to juvenile court and
face a greater risk of adjudication and incarceration than they would
have had they not been unsuccessful in diversion.436  Police also flag
diverted youth as high risk and subject them to heightened scrutiny
and public stigma.437  Other critics complain that diversion programs
430 See, e.g., Cahn & Robbins, supra note 428, at 98–99 (noting recidivism rates of 5% R
during the first six months in the Time Dollar Youth Court, 9% in the first twelve months
as compared to 33–35% for the comparison group, and estimating the nationwide cost of
Youth Court programs at $458 per youth compared to $1,635 per youth on probation and
$21,000–$84,000 per youth for juvenile justice processing).
431 Cocozza et al., supra note 429, at 937. R
432 Id.
433 See id. (listing various diversion programs in the community that include service
components and justice components).
434 See Ctr. on Juvenile & Criminal Justice, Widening the Net in Juvenile Justice and
the Dangers of Prevention and Early Intervention 1–6 (2001); Cocozza et al., supra note
429, at 940; Mary Ellen Reimund, Is Restorative Justice on a Collision Course with the Constitu- R
tion?, 3 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 17–18 (2004); Debra Oldenettel & Madeline Wordes, The Com-
munity Assessment Center Concept, JUV. JUST. BULL., Mar. 2000, at 10.
435 TRACY M. GODWIN ET AL., AM. PROB. & PAROLE ASS’N, PEER JUSTICE AND YOUTH EM-
POWERMENT: AN IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR TEEN COURT PROGRAMS 30 (1996) (pointing
out due process concerns when youth are compelled to admit guilt before admission into
diversion programs such as teen court).
436 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Goodbye to Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal of
Restorative Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751, 761–63 (2000) (discussing the risk that prosecutors
will use youth’s incriminating statements against them at trial if victim-offender mediation
is unsuccessful).
437 See Zachary K. Hamilton et al., Diverting Multi-Problem Youth from Juvenile Justice: In-
vestigating the Importance of Community Influence on Placement and Recidivism, 25 BEHAV. SCI. &
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generally operate with no judicial oversight and too often include
those who are innocent or should otherwise be completely excused.438
To guard against these concerns, standards should ensure that no case
be prosecuted or diverted unless the prosecutor reasonably believes that
a delinquency charge would be substantiated against the youth with
admissible evidence at a trial.439  More importantly, this Article advo-
cates for the realignment of resources to school-based and commu-
nity-based interventions that do not require state intervention and
oversight.  Prosecutors should resist unwarranted juvenile court refer-
rals and systemically limit the use of courts for the regulation of rela-
tively harmless, normal adolescent behavior.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the growing body of developmental research
demonstrating that much of juvenile crime and delinquency is the
product of normal adolescent development, contemporary narratives
portraying youth of color as dangerous and irredeemable lead police,
probation officers, and prosecutors to reject age as an excuse or miti-
gation for these youth.  Aggressive institutional approaches toward ad-
olescent offending motivated by explicit or implicit racial bias lead to
the disproportionate arrest, prosecution, and disposition of black and
Hispanic youth.  This Article considers reform in prosecutorial deci-
sion making at the intake stage as a viable strategy to reduce dispro-
portionate minority contact in the juvenile justice system.  Specifically,
this Article proposes that prosecutors acknowledge the unique devel-
opmental status of adolescents and develop guidelines for prosecuting
youth that adequately account for the youth’s amenability to treat-
ment and diminished culpability in criminal activity.  These standards
should also hold prosecutors accountable for confronting implicit bias
not only in their own decisions, but also in the decisions of other sys-
tem stakeholders.  By engaging the community, collaborating with de-
velopmental psychologists, and delineating adolescent-appropriate
factors to guide the charging decision, prosecution standards should
begin to erode harmful stereotypes about youth of color and hope-
fully reduce racial disparities in the system over time.  Recognizing
that the actual or perceived lack of community-based resources in
L. 137, 140–41 (2007) (discussing the theory that mere identification of diverted youth
enhances probability of detention and stigma because of continued contact with the
system).
438 Frank A. Orlando, Mediation Involving Children in the U.S.: Legal and Ethical Conflicts,
in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON TRIAL: PITFALLS AND POTENTIALS OF VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION
333, 338 (Heinz Messmer & Hans-Uwe Otto eds., 1992) (discussing a study claiming that
up to three-quarters of youth would not have been brought to the court’s attention if a
diversion program had not existed).
439 NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note 307, at 65. R
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communities of color will likely hinder reforms in prosecutorial charg-
ing decisions, this Article also proposes that prosecutors take a leader-
ship role to ensure that resources are fairly allocated to the
implementation of adolescent-appropriate responses to delinquency
as an alternative to law enforcement and juvenile court interventions.
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